




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# Cold War Cosmopolitanism: The Asia Foundation and 1950s Korean Cinema

Christina Klein

*South Korean films first became visible on the world stage in the late 1950s when they began to be exhibited and win prizes at international film festivals. Yi Pyŏngil's *The Wedding Day* (1956) and Han Hyŏngmo's *Because I Love You* (1958) were among Korea's earliest award-winning films. These two films exemplify a postcolonial and postwar discourse I am calling "Cold War cosmopolitanism." The cultivation of this cosmopolitan ethos among cultural producers was a major objective for Americans waging the cultural Cold War in Asia, and the Asia Foundation was Washington's primary instrument for doing so. This article traces the history of the Asia Foundation from its inception in the National Security Council in the late 1940s through its activities in Korea in the 1950s and early 1960s. It pays particular attention to the foundation's support for Korean participation in the Asian Film Festival. It offers a close textual and historical reading of Yi's and Han's films as a means of exploring how Korean cultural producers, acting as Cold War entrepreneurs, took advantage of the Asia Foundation's resources in ways that furthered their own aesthetic, economic, and political interests.*

**Keywords:** Cold War cosmopolitanism, cultural Cold War, the Asia Foundation, Golden Age Cinema, Han Hyŏngmo

## INTRODUCTION

South Korean films became visible on the world stage for the first time in the late 1950s. Between 1957 and 1960, at least nine Korean films were shown at the

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Asian Film Festival; more screened in Berlin, San Francisco, and other festivals in the West. Among the first to receive prizes were Yi Pyöngil's *The Wedding Day* (1956), which won the best comedy award at the fourth Asian Film Festival, held in Tokyo in 1957, and Han Hyöngmo's *Because I Love You* (1958), which took a prize for best choreography at the same festival held in Kuala Lumpur two years later.<sup>1</sup> Neither of them tells an explicitly Cold War story. *The Wedding Day* is a period comedy about the efforts of a social-climbing father to marry off his daughter to the son of a *yangban* official; *Because I Love You* is a contemporary drama that revolves around a widow's discovery that her husband, long presumed killed in the Pacific War, is alive and living in Malaysia. Nonetheless, I propose to read these two films as deeply revealing instances of Cold War cinema. They embody what I am calling "Cold War cosmopolitanism"—an ethos of worldly engagement that permeated Korea's Golden Age cinema.

The vitality of Golden Age cinema derives in part from the fact that it took shape within a cultural field that was being reconstructed by a host of domestic and foreign forces. As film scholars such as Steven Chung, Hye Seung Chung, and David Scott Diffrient have shown, individual filmmakers and the industry as whole were profoundly shaped by Korea's tax code and censorship laws, the legacies of Japanese colonialism, war and ongoing tensions with North Korea, the large US military presence, and the influx of Hollywood, European, and Hong Kong films.<sup>2</sup> I want to suggest that Washington's waging of the cultural Cold War in Asia was one of these transformative forces. In making this claim, I join a burgeoning conversation among cultural historians of the Cold War, including Charles Armstrong, Han Sang Kim, and Poshek Fu, whose work is beginning to reveal the nature and extent of Washington's interventions in Asia's cultural life.<sup>3</sup> This article builds on the work of Sangjoon Lee in particular, who has explored the role of the Asia Foundation in revitalizing the Korean film industry and has charted the history of the Asian Film Festival.<sup>4</sup> With this article I seek to deepen our understanding of the Asia Foundation's presence in Korea by illuminating one of the organization's foundational ideas—Cold War cosmopolitanism—and exploring how Korean filmmakers engaged with it.

This article makes four interrelated arguments. First, I argue that a core objective for Americans waging the cultural Cold War was to identify and cultivate an emerging cosmopolitan sensibility among Asian artists, intellectuals, and mass media producers. In doing so, I join those scholars who are moving beyond the traditional definition of cosmopolitanism as a universalist political philosophy or ethical commitment and are instead investigating the "range of cosmopolitan practices that have actually existed in history."<sup>5</sup> The notion of Cold War cosmopolitanism appears to be an oxymoron, given that the Cold War entailed dividing the globe into opposing blocs, separating them with impermeable borders, and pressuring nations to choose exclusive affiliation with one side or the other. Yet the Cold War was a force of integration as well as division, and the creation of "free Asia" as a viable entity required a new degree of engagement among its

members. Cold War cosmopolitanism is perhaps best understood as the Asian counterpart to America's Cold War Orientalism. Washington's push to bring "free Asia" into existence exerted pressure on noncommunist Asians and Americans alike, as it encouraged them to turn their attention to the world beyond their borders and to engage with each other. In the United States, this led to the proliferation of middlebrow narratives about Americans forging sympathetic bonds with people in Asia.<sup>6</sup> This encouragement towards worldly engagement affected the content and style of a broad swath of Asian culture as well.

Cold War cosmopolitanism, as I am defining it, encompassed both aesthetics and practices: the term characterizes the expressive qualities of postwar Asian texts as well as the material processes of their production, circulation, and exhibition. As a postcolonial discourse, it superseded the older cosmopolitan vision of Japanese imperial culture. As a postwar discourse, it was strictly delimited to the "free world" and highlighted the forging of ties with the United States and, crucially, other noncommunist Asian countries. It engaged the ideals of individualism, personal freedom, and capitalist exchange and expressed a commitment to social and technological modernization along Western lines. This attitude of openness towards the "free world" took form in stylistically hybrid works of Asian culture that combined indigenous and foreign elements and exhibited a worldly command of up-to-date techniques and ideas. It also found expression in works that enabled the display of distinctive national cultures on a world stage, packaged as part of emerging world cinema that could be appreciated by others. Cold War cosmopolitanism thus embraced rather than transcended nationalism. It privileged the knitting of ties—symbolic as well as material—among "free" nations that valued their own heritage and wanted to share it with others. As a historically specific form of cosmopolitanism, it can be seen as a cultural manifestation of the political ideology of "free-world" integration: it resonated with the dual impulses of nation building and bloc building that structured postwar Asia's political landscape.<sup>7</sup> Many Asian intellectuals and cultural producers—eager to strengthen their nation's cultural output and to gain the respect of the "free-world" community—embraced Cold War cosmopolitanism as a worldview, a style, and a practice.<sup>8</sup>

Second, I argue that the Asia Foundation was the single most important American entity promoting Cold War cosmopolitanism in Asia. An ostensibly private philanthropic organization headquartered in San Francisco, the Asia Foundation (TAF) supported a broad array of cultural and civic initiatives. It was also a CIA front organization, one of the most expansive the agency created during the early years of the Cold War. While the story of its European counterpart, the Congress for Cultural Freedom, has been well told, the workings of the Asia Foundation are only now coming to light.<sup>9</sup> TAF played a singular role in the cultural Cold War. According to Charles Armstrong, it was unique in its "emphasis on intra-Asian networking. . . . No other American organization had such a clear and consistent vision of 'Free Asia' and such a multi-faceted program of how it could be

achieved.”<sup>10</sup> The Asia Foundation regarded the cultivation of “mutual respect and understanding” among Asian countries, and between Asia and the West, as one of its “principal objectives.”<sup>11</sup>

Third, I argue that Korea during the 1950s and 1960s offers a particularly salient instance of the Asia Foundation’s promotion of Cold War cosmopolitanism. Asia Foundation personnel saw Korea as an ideal candidate for cultural reconstruction. Forty-five years of Japanese colonization, three years of war, and the trauma of national division had undermined Korea’s traditions, ravaged its cultural institutions, and impoverished its artists and intellectuals. TAF saw these deficits as creating a unique opportunity to cultivate a more liberal and worldly culture. In Korea, TAF sought to revitalize the nation’s cultural heritage while also encouraging the selective embrace of new ideas from abroad. Ideally, Korea’s new cosmopolitan culture would foreground the nation’s distinct traditions while also demonstrating its willingness to modernize.

Fourth, I argue that *The Wedding Day* and *Because I Love You* embody this Korean version of Cold War cosmopolitan culture. In their expressive content and style, as well as in the material history of their production, distribution, and exhibition, these films reveal how the abstract ideal of Cold War cosmopolitanism became manifest within individual works of Korean culture. In making this claim, I am not arguing for a narrowly causal relationship: while TAF provided direct and indirect support to both these films, it was not responsible for their creation. Rather, I show how the Asia Foundation shaped the national and regional cultural fields within which these films were created and regarded as worthy of acclaim.

This article, unlike other scholarship on the Asia Foundation, combines historical and interpretive modes of analysis, considers the material and aesthetic consequences of TAF’s activities, and brings together Korean and American voices. By reading these films both textually and historically, it is something of a hybrid endeavor. In many ways, this is an archival project. My telling of TAF’s story draws on extensive research in the Asia Foundation archives, in TAF president Robert Blum’s papers, and in the CIA’s collection of declassified documents. The CIA, as the academic wing of the national-security apparatus, produced vast quantities of research, and TAF’s archives are substantial (and largely untapped). This archive is both fantastically rich and, of necessity, limited. It tells the story of the foundation’s work from the foundation’s perspective, with all the national and ideological biases one would expect from a CIA organization. While many Koreans are mentioned in the documents, for example, their views are rarely expressed directly or in depth. In an effort to move beyond these limitations and to see how Korean interests both overlapped with and diverged from TAF’s, I have made forays into Korean-language sources such as newspapers, magazines, oral histories, film reviews, and works of scholarship. Because Korean film production in the 1950s had a transnational dimension, I have also looked at Chinese-language sources such as newspapers and materials in the Hong Kong

Film Archive. The films themselves, of course, are primary expressions of Korean voices. Through textual analysis of them, I provide a sense of how Korean cultural producers, as creative individuals and active agents, engaged with TAF's agenda. My aim is to explore the cultural Cold War as a conversation—albeit a lopsided one—in which both Americans and Koreans participated. In paying particular attention to *Because I Love You*, I am bringing a previously lost film by a well-known director into the critical light. While no print exists, the film's script was discovered during the process of researching this article.<sup>12</sup> By reading this script in relation to production stills, publicity material, reviews, and other documentation, I have been able to reconstruct a reasonable, but by no means complete, picture of the film.

This article begins, in part 1, by narrating the history of the Asia Foundation in some detail, including its support for commercial cinema and the Asian Film Festival. Part 2 delineates the work of TAF's Seoul office and its promotion of Cold War cosmopolitanism among Korean cultural producers, including filmmakers. Parts 3 and 4 explore how *The Wedding Day* and *Because I Love* embodied this cosmopolitan sensibility in their content, style, production, distribution, and exhibition.

## THE ASIA FOUNDATION

The Asia Foundation was conceived in Washington in the immediate aftermath of the “loss” of China and the outbreak of the Korean War, when US foreign policymakers turned their attention to Asia as the primary site of the Cold War.<sup>13</sup> Between 1949 and 1951, the National Security Council issued a series of policy papers, collectively known as NSC 48, that laid out “the position of the United States with respect to Asia.” These reports described the many challenges facing Asia—social and economic as well as political—and offered as solutions the policies of containment and integration Washington had initially developed for Europe. NSC 48 declared that Washington's overall objectives in Asia were to “assist in the development of truly independent, friendly, stable and self-sustaining states,” and to “contain” and “reduce the power and influence” of the Soviet Union. While NSC 48 advocated a military buildup in Asia, it also called for an information program that would help orient the people of Asia towards the West and away from communism.<sup>14</sup>

NSC 48 articulated two principles that would underpin the work of the Asia Foundation. First, it acknowledged the power within Asia of “intense nationalism.” Recognizing that the “long colonial tradition in Asia has left the peoples of that area suspicious of Western influence,” the drafters of NSC 48 advocated finding new modes of action that would avoid replicating colonial power relations and thereby not “excite further suspicion of our motives.” Rather than seeming to impose American solutions on Asian problems, policymakers should try to approach problems “from the Asiatic point of view in so far as possible” and

“refrain from taking the lead in movements which must of necessity be of Asian origin.” In the midst of decolonization, Washington had to find ways to lead from behind. Second, NSC 48 advocated that Washington encourage these new nations’ outward turn and increased engagement with other democratic nations. Washington had to work toward the creation of “free Asia” not just as an ideological slogan but as a viable entity. Troubled by the “antipathies” and “lack of affinity among Asian nations,” the drafters of NSC 48 sought to encourage a “consciousness of common interests” among these diverse countries and facilitate “regional collaboration” in all its varied forms.<sup>15</sup> NSC 48 thus laid out a dual agenda for waging the Cold War in Asia. The United States would pursue both nation building and bloc building: it would support the nationalist drive to strengthen newly independent noncommunist nations, and it would seek to integrate these nations into the larger worldwide alliance of “free” nations. American interests did not simply require noncommunist Asians to ally themselves with the United States; they needed to ally themselves with each other as well.

Achieving these goals required a *modus operandi* rooted in the dynamics of affiliation rather than control. From Washington’s perspective, success in the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union would likely “rest with the side which succeed[ed] in identifying its own cause with that of the Asian peoples and which succeed[ed] in working in harmony with the dominant motivating forces in Asia . . . and in influencing these forces rather than attempting by direct or impatient methods to control them.”<sup>16</sup> Identification, harmony, influence: these would become the key concepts for waging the cultural Cold War in Asia.

In early 1951, at the height of the Korean War, the CIA took steps to put these principles into action by creating the Committee for Free Asia (CFA).<sup>17</sup> The public face of the CFA was as a nonprofit foundation headquartered in San Francisco and run by a group of California businessmen. Its witting employees, however, knew it to be a creature of the CIA whose mission was to engage in “psychological warfare in the informational field.”<sup>18</sup> Sanctioned by the National Security Council and funded by the CIA, it was designed to be “a private instrumentality that would be privately governed and would have the freedom and flexibility to do things the government would like to see done but which it chose not to do or could not do directly as well.”<sup>19</sup> As with many other front organizations created in the late 1940s and 1950s, the inspiration for the CFA was derived, in part, from the Soviet Union’s Popular Front strategy of the 1930s: the CIA admired the Left’s ability to mobilize large groups of ordinary people on behalf of an internationalist agenda by tapping into their particular interests.<sup>20</sup> Much of the CFA’s energy went towards Radio Free Asia, which like its European counterpart targeted specific populations and tried to mold public opinion in accordance with US policy objectives.<sup>21</sup> After three years of operation, however, the CIA realized Radio Free Asia was being dismissed as “a propaganda outfit directed *at* Asians” and that the CFA’s very name was alienating millions of postcolonial Asians who were “proud

of the fact that they [were] already free” and who resented Western attempts to tell them what to think.<sup>22</sup>

In 1953–54, the CIA reorganized the Committee for Free Asia and relaunched it as the Asia Foundation under the more competent leadership of Robert Blum, a seasoned intelligence officer with close ties to CIA director Allen Dulles.<sup>23</sup> The most visible changes were made in the organization’s name; in the termination of Radio Free Asia; and in the board of directors, which now included more well-known Asia experts. Under Blum’s leadership, TAF replaced CFA’s stridently anticommunist rhetoric with a more positive and sentimental one that resonated with the discourse of Cold War Orientalism: Blum emphasized, for example, the need for Americans and Asians to “sympathize” with each other’s aspirations and see each other as “equals.”<sup>24</sup> He also embraced the language of personal relationships typical of this era of people-to-people diplomacy and pledged to cultivate relationships of “genuine friendship” between the United States and Asia.<sup>25</sup> (The overlaps with Cold War Orientalism were institutional as well as rhetorical: novelist James Michener, one of the foremost producers of Cold War Orientalism, was a founding member of TAF’s board of directors and served as president of the Fund for Asia, a subsidiary front organization created in 1954 to provide cover for TAF by raising funds from the private sector. Michener, needless to say, was witting about the CIA’s role in both organizations.)<sup>26</sup> Blum’s commitment to regional integration was based on the belief that “isolation and mutual suspicion among Asian nations” contributed to their weakness and enhanced the attraction of communist China. Such isolation could best be reduced through intra-Asian activities that stimulated “exchange” and “cross-fertilization” across national borders.<sup>27</sup>

Blum focused on what the Committee for Free Asia had done well, namely, nurturing Asian initiatives. Motivated by two questions—“What does Asia want?” and “How does CFA give it to them?”—the CFA had funded individuals and organizations working towards suitably noncommunist goals.<sup>28</sup> Blum extended this vision of “working with and through other peoples” and continued to support “projects designed, directed, and executed by Asians.”<sup>29</sup> The foundation pursued these goals by making direct grants of money, providing equipment and supplies, encouraging private American organizations to assist their Asian counterparts, and offering advice and moral support to local leaders.<sup>30</sup> By 1956, the Asia Foundation had offices in thirteen countries or areas, stretching from Afghanistan to Japan. Committed to decentralization, Blum gave his field representatives broad latitude to set their own priorities and allocate resources as they saw fit. Because it was an ostensibly private organization, the local offices were able to support a broader range of organizations, including leftist and neutralist groups, than would have been possible for an official US agency during the McCarthy era. While TAF provided most of this support openly, it sought to keep its Asian auxiliaries, rather than itself, in the foreground, “according them maximum credit for ideas and accomplishments even when the actual work ha[d] been done, to a large extent, by . . . American personnel.”<sup>31</sup> The foundation was acutely aware



of communist charges of “American cultural imperialism,” and it worked hard to nullify them, making every effort to take on an “Asian coloration.”<sup>32</sup>

If TAF’s overt identity was as an aid organization, its covert mission was to further US interests in the region. The ultimate objective of its philanthropy, in keeping with its origins in NSC 48, was to “insure political developments in host countries [were] favorable to the United States.”<sup>33</sup> TAF also functioned as an intelligence-gathering operation: through its extensive contacts with Asia’s social, cultural, and political leaders, it collected information “not otherwise available to the Agency” and passed it on to the CIA through a steady flow of reports.<sup>34</sup> The CIA relished the “depth of access” the foundation enjoyed and gloated that no communist government had among its assets “an independently-chartered organization with capital and personnel capable of making such wide and varied impact throughout Asia.” The Asia Foundation’s “image, flexibility and effectiveness,” exulted the agency, “appear to be unique.”<sup>35</sup>

The Asia Foundation did indeed play a unique role in the cultural Cold War in Asia. Unlike well-funded private aid organizations such as the Rockefeller Foundation, which often made large grants to American institutions such as universities and New York’s Asia Society, the Asia Foundation typically made relatively small grants—anywhere from a few hundred to fifty thousand dollars—directly to Asian organizations. In the mid-1950s, it directed most of its support to youth and education programs, social and economic groups, and mass communications.<sup>36</sup> With its relatively small budget—\$1.5 million in 1952, \$3 million in 1954, \$6.6 million in 1957<sup>37</sup>—it generally provided seed money to get a project launched or interim funds to get over a rough patch, rather than ongoing funding. In keeping with its commitment to capitalist democracy, it aimed to stimulate enterprises that could go on to become self-sustaining. As a result, it gave grants to thousands of recipients across Asia. Unlike US-government propaganda agencies such as USIS, TAF did not produce or dictate content. It sought to stimulate the production of politically sympathetic local cultures rather than use local instruments to disseminate American-produced content. Once it decided an organization or individual was worth supporting, it generally maintained a hands-off approach; its ideological work was in the choice of whom to support, not in micromanaging what they did. It typically made grants in response to direct application from Asian individuals and organizations and “seldom if ever” exerted “direct control of the instrumentality being funded.”<sup>38</sup> When it identified a compelling program area that did not have any local institutional support, however, it sometimes fostered the creation of a group it could then fund (as we will see below).

The CIA understood, with a sophistication unmatched by any other US agency, that culture was a central arena for waging the Cold War. Through TAF, the CIA reached deep into cultural fields across Asia. The foundation recognized that mass media were vitally important tools for disseminating ideas, and it established numerous programs to ensure a steady supply of newspapers, magazines, and books sympathetic to US aims. Beyond the direct expression of democratic and anti-

communist ideas, however, TAF had a highly developed understanding of the social and political roles of culture. For Blum, culture was a realm in which the United States must exercise its power—it was “one of the elements we have to influence in order to make our policies effective.” Blum enthusiastically endorsed a 1962 staff report that summarized the foundation’s arts philosophy and provided guidance for future programming. The report urged all TAF representatives to become knowledgeable “arts patrons” in their host countries. It was important for them to recognize the “cultural scene” as a barometer that could give them “an indication of the direction in which society [was] heading” and to be able to read cultural signals with some nuance. Thinking strategically, support for folk arts could promote healthy nationalism, healing potentially dangerous social divisions between urban and rural populations; by validating indigenous cultural forms spurned by Westernized elites and promoting a balance between “artistic traditionalism” and “modernizing efforts,” TAF representatives could encourage a sense of shared national identity. Because critics and reviewers could also bridge the gap between old and new ways of thinking, TAF supported literary and art magazines. More ideologically, TAF regarded creativity as a distinctly “free-world” value intrinsically bound up with individualism and gave its support to contemporary artists. In contrast to communists who valued art as a tool of indoctrination, the report claimed that “unrestrictive artistic expression with its creative right of doubt and even error is one of the main attractions possessed by the pluralistic societies of the Free World in the struggle for human minds.” The foundation also saw the production and circulation of culture as an economic activity, which meant that promoting media and the arts could do double duty as economic development. Supporting the arts often proved cost effective, as well, in that “a lot can be achieved with comparatively small amounts of money for well conceived projects.” It was also politically wise. Artists, writers, and intellectuals were potentially volatile social actors whose “frustration” at a lack of opportunity might lead them to “radical solutions.”<sup>39</sup> Foundation support for the arts was thus a way to channel artists’ activist impulses in politically desirable directions. In making its myriad investments in Asia’s cultural spheres, TAF understood itself to be pursuing long-term objectives, and it encouraged its field representatives to support projects that did not necessarily yield immediate results.

TAF’s approach to the arts was quite catholic, and in the 1950s it channeled substantial resources towards popular, commercial cinema. TAF launched a film program soon after its inception in 1951, when it began financing the production of propagandistic films made by Americans and targeted at viewers across Southeast Asia. Similar to Radio Free Asia, however, these were met with indifference and hostility. In response, Blum and program director James L. Stewart redirected TAF’s film efforts away from propaganda and towards entertainment. Recognizing that film was the most popular form of mass entertainment across the continent, they sought out opportunities to nudge commercial cinema in desirable directions and to expand the audience for pro-Western films. The TAF representative in

Tokyo, Noel Busch, was deeply concerned about the box-office successes of what he and his staff perceived to be anti-American Japanese films, while the Hong Kong representative, James T. Ivy, worried about the popularity of leftist Mandarin-language films among the overseas Chinese. Both offices, therefore, funded projects designed to increase the quality of noncommunist pictures and thereby attract larger audiences. The most elaborate—and expensive—of these projects involved the creation of Asia Pictures, a Hong Kong production company with a fully equipped studio, which made entertaining films with an “ideological message” aimed at overseas Chinese audiences in Southeast Asia.<sup>40</sup> None of the projects, however, was regarded as wholly successful.<sup>41</sup>

The foundation had somewhat better success with the Asian Film Festival, which became its main vehicle for supporting commercial cinema across the region. Launched in 1954, the Asian Film Festival was among the first international film festivals held in Asia and, like the Berlin Film Festival, was a Cold War creation open only to noncommunist countries.<sup>42</sup> The Asian Film Festival was an industry-oriented event that brought together national delegations, provided opportunities for members to do business with each other, and awarded prizes. The festival was the brainchild of Masaichi Nagata, head of Daiei studio in Japan, who also created the Federation of Motion Picture Producers Association of Asia (FPA), a professional organization that sponsored the festival and worked to stimulate intra-Asian film exports. The Asian Film Festival stands as an exemplary instance of TAF’s *modus operandi* of giving support to indigenous initiatives that aligned with Washington’s interests. Asia’s commercial filmmakers, in pursuing their own economic interests by working to improve their product and expand their markets, were in harmony with Washington’s political goals of stimulating regional integration and strengthening noncommunist media production.<sup>43</sup>

TAF supported the Asian Film Festival overtly and covertly throughout the 1950s.<sup>44</sup> The Tokyo office shepherded these efforts, having worked closely with Nagata since the festival’s initial planning. Initially, representative Noel Busch and motion-picture officer John Miller valued the festival as an opportunity to orient Asian film industries “toward the west instead of the east”<sup>45</sup> by forging closer ties with Hollywood, which were much desired by Japanese producers. To that end, they purchased a professional 35mm Mitchell film camera to be awarded as a prize at the inaugural festival, ostensibly as a gift from the Hollywood Motion Picture Producers’ Association. They also arranged for Hollywood producer-director Frank Borzage to attend the festival as a guest of honor in 1954 and producer William Seiter to do the same in 1956. The Tokyo office also regularly contributed \$1,000 to the festival’s annual operating budget. Other TAF offices worked to sustain the anticommunist tenor of the festival. TAF representatives helped select delegations from their host countries and discreetly paid their expenses, thereby ensuring the presence of anticommunist voices in festival debates and on award juries. They also used their local contacts to vet potential festival submissions, checking to see whether films were “politically and/or ideologically

against the best interests” of the foundation and “the Free World” and working to keep such “objectionable” films out.<sup>46</sup>

After the disappointments with its projects geared toward individual Asian films, producers, and studios, TAF appreciated the Asian Film Festival as an opportunity to support filmmaking at the national and regional level. By bestowing awards and stimulating exports, the festival created opportunities for strengthening industries as a whole and for improving the status of noncommunist producers within those industries. It also promised to increase commercial ties and raise professional standards across the region by fostering cooperation and friendly competition among industries. TAF valued the festival as a site for the “exchange of culture”: as filmmakers from across Asia watched each other’s films, they would hopefully develop the “international understanding” and “harmony” Washington saw as so vital for the sustenance of “free Asia.”<sup>47</sup> While Japan’s highly developed film industry dominated the early festivals, TAF believed smaller industries would benefit as well. John Miller in particular was convinced that the prestige of the event would “stimulate the comparatively backward film producers of Asia to higher quality production”<sup>48</sup> as they focused their energies on making films good enough to be accepted into the festival and hopefully win prizes.

### THE ASIA FOUNDATION IN KOREA

The Asia Foundation made its first foray into Korea in 1951 when it delivered a thousand tons of newsprint for textbook publishing during the Korean War; it established a Seoul office in 1954. James L. Stewart, who had been the director of USIS in Seoul in the late 1940s, managed the early Korea projects from the foundation’s Tokyo office before transferring to the San Francisco office in 1951 to serve as program director. Philip Rowe, who had also worked with USIS in Seoul, served as the first field representative from 1954 until his sudden death from polio in June 1955, at which point Mary Walker was transferred from the Tokyo office to serve as interim representative and became the first woman to serve as head of a TAF office. Lawrence G. Thompson succeeded Walker in late 1956 and was in turn succeeded by John E. (Jack) James in 1958. Six full-time Korean staff members assisted these representatives, including Cho Tongjae, who served as program advisor.<sup>49</sup>

Korea was at the forefront of TAF’s commitment to culture, receiving more support for cultural programs than did any other program area.<sup>50</sup> Already in 1952–53, TAF was developing a cultural program for Korea that focused on the liberal arts and that promised to “encourage the artist, build up his ranks, unite the people under a developing indigenous culture, and link cultural progress to freedom under democracy.”<sup>51</sup> Once established, the Seoul office pursued big ambitions: it sought nothing less than “a renaissance of Korean culture.” Such a rebirth was deemed vitally important after the “cultural disaster” of Japanese colonialism

and the physical destruction of the Korean War. The Seoul office was greatly encouraged by the signs of creative “ferment” in postwar Korea, and in 1955 it reported that the “Korean talent for music, art, and literature is slowly emerging with . . . amazing vitality.”<sup>52</sup> The Seoul office disbursed about \$200,000 a year throughout the later 1950s to support a wide range of projects.<sup>53</sup> (While this doesn’t seem like a lot of money, the postwar cultural economy was not sufficiently developed to support large infusions of cash.) Over the course of the decade, the Seoul office directed its resources towards intellectuals and the fields of education, culture, and communication. It supported intellectual and popular magazines with grants of paper, brought in American athletic coaches and English teachers, supported the creation of the country’s first art gallery, and arranged for the donation of Western musical scores. Some projects had an explicitly anti-communist focus, such as the Freedom Writers project, which published refugees’ eyewitness accounts of life in North Korea.<sup>54</sup> Most, however, did not.

As they doled out these funds, the Seoul representatives encouraged the emergence of Cold War cultural “entrepreneurs.”<sup>55</sup> To think of Korean artists, intellectuals, and civic leaders as entrepreneurs is to recognize the extent to which the waging of the cultural Cold War entailed the opening up of new creative and professional opportunities for Korean people. The Seoul office made material resources available and invited Koreans to use them for their own advancement, as well as for the social impact that advancement would deliver. I use the term “Cold War entrepreneurs” to refer to those Koreans who took advantage of these opportunities and resources. Sometimes these entrepreneurs did so out of a shared commitment to the foundation’s values and goals, such as anticommunism or artistic freedom; for others, professional or financial motives may have been primary.

Many of the projects these entrepreneurs proposed and that the Seoul office supported were intended to strengthen Korea’s national culture. The Asia Foundation believed that the spiritual and political existence of the fledgling nation was at stake and that cultural projects could do much to affirm an emerging South Korean national identity that was implicitly defined in opposition to the North.<sup>56</sup> According to Tokyo representative Delmer Brown, the partition of the peninsula in 1945 had created a “laboratory situation” in which free and communist ways of life were being tried out side by side.<sup>57</sup> With North Korea looming as a counter-example of postcolonial nation building, the foundation keenly felt the need to protect indigenous Korean culture in the face of the North’s “totalitarian labors to smash the traditions of the nation and compel its people to look for new values in Marxism.” As the author of one report proclaimed, “cultural heritage is an ally.”<sup>58</sup> The Seoul representatives were thus very receptive to requests to support projects that had a national dimension. The office donated equipment to enable the National Museum to catalog its collection. It gave funds for the creation of a *han’gŭl* dictionary. At a time when academic libraries contained mostly books written in Japanese and Chinese, it sponsored the creation of a Social Science Research Center and Library, which enabled the production of Korean-language

scholarship. It encouraged the revival of the Mask Dance, a theatrical folk cultural form that had been banned by the Japanese but that the Seoul office believed had the potential to appeal to modern audiences.<sup>59</sup> These projects showcase TAF's commitment to nation building and its support for a postcolonial reconstruction of national identity rooted in indigenous traditions.

At the same time, the representatives also sought to inculcate a Cold War cosmopolitan worldview among Koreans. In this goal, we can see the foundation's commitment to bloc building. It was deeply concerned that Japanese colonialism had left Korea a provincial and isolated nation, so it devoted a great deal of energy to fostering ties between Korea and other "free-world" countries.<sup>60</sup> This objective was articulated very clearly in the 1955 Plan for Korea, a master blueprint produced during Mary Walker's tenure that laid out the foundation's objectives, priorities, and programs. As much as the foundation supported Korea's cultural renaissance, it made clear this rebirth could not consist exclusively of the revival of Korean traditions. The few remnants of Korea's "archaic" culture that had survived colonialism were "hardly" able to "serve a modern society."<sup>61</sup> Traditional forms of culture needed to be modernized rather than simply exhumed, and "old social customs, traditions, folkways [needed to] be re-evaluated and interpreted to meet current conditions."<sup>62</sup> Nor could Korea's new culture be wholly national in orientation since the Seoul office regarded "the pervading and empty spirit of present-day nationalism" as a frequent obstacle to genuine reconstruction.<sup>63</sup> Instead, the foundation set out to promote a worldly Korean culture in which the national culture would be invigorated through sustained encounter with foreign ideas.<sup>64</sup> The national and the cosmopolitan were thus partners in this dual project of nation building and bloc building: Korean national culture would be enmeshed within a network of "free-world" ties even as it was being reborn.

To this end, the Plan for Korea pledged to support Koreans in their "adaptation of Free World cultural experiences," as well as in their "evaluation and reconstruction of the Korean past." TAF sought to midwife into existence a culture rooted in indigenous traditions yet open to Western ideas and engaged with cultural developments across the democratic world. Adaptation was the key concept: the plan asserted that Western patterns would "not serve Korea without tailoring to size," and it pledged to identify those Koreans who would be "capable of managing the adaptation." The plan also pledged to support projects that promoted "Korean understanding of the modern world, its goals, and its ideologies," that encouraged "Korean ties with the Free World," and that facilitated the "exchange of Korean and other Free World experience."<sup>65</sup>

The Seoul office targeted many of its grants in order to bring this new cosmopolitan Korean culture into existence. At a time when the Korean government severely limited the ability of its citizens to leave the country, TAF's Seoul representatives enthusiastically supported international travel. They sent many Koreans abroad to participate in international conferences and exchange ideas with colleagues from other countries.<sup>66</sup> TAF regarded travel as essential for ending Korea's

historical isolation, for enabling Koreans to learn about other cultures, and for making Korea known to the larger world. Similarly, TAF felt Koreans must be enmeshed in networks of cultural “exchange” through which they would learn about the literature and arts of neighboring countries.<sup>67</sup> In addition, the Seoul representatives sought to render whole categories of cultural production more cosmopolitan: they supported works of painting, music, and film, the production of which involved people from more than one country, incorporated stylistic elements drawn from foreign cultures, and aimed at foreign as well as domestic audiences. The Seoul newspapers covered the foundation’s work carefully and thereby disseminated widely its vision of a new Korean culture. Most Korean artists and intellectuals, therefore, would have been intimately aware of the foundation’s ideals and the kind of work it supported.

An integral part of TAF’s cosmopolitan vision entailed making Korean culture more visible abroad. Korea was not regarded simply as a recipient and adapter of foreign ideas but also as a contributor to world culture. The exhibition of Korean culture abroad became one of the Seoul office’s major objectives: Koreans, TAF insisted, must “represent Korea abroad” and must make their country “understood abroad.”<sup>68</sup> The Plan for Korea, therefore, called for programming that would “develop in Asia” and beyond “an understanding of Korean culture” and a “respect for the developing expression of this culture.”<sup>69</sup> This objective had political overtones: the foundation was adamant that the Republic of Korea, as a newly independent postcolonial nation, become visible as a full-fledged member of the democratic “free world.” Korea’s postwar reconstruction and modernization—largely financed by the United States—must be put on display alongside its unique cultural heritage. To that end, the Seoul office pledged “to assist Koreans to bring their cultural achievements . . . to the attention of other members of the free world family of nations, and to gain a position of respect in this family.”<sup>70</sup> Korea’s new “family” ties would be forged, in part, through the export of its music and literature.<sup>71</sup>

Popular cinema held great promise for making Korean culture known abroad. One of TAF’s largest projects in Korea targeted commercial film, but unlike earlier projects in Japan and Hong Kong, it aimed to strengthen the industry as a whole. With strong support from headquarters in San Francisco and assistance from John Miller, the motion-picture officer in Tokyo, the Seoul office set out to nurture a commercial film industry that was beginning to flower in the mid-1950s. Concerned about filmmakers’ dependence on government equipment, and thus their susceptibility to government control, TAF developed a project designed to give commercial filmmakers the freedom to make entertaining movies audiences would truly want to see. It began by ushering into existence a professional organization, the Korean Motion Picture Cultural Association (KMPCA), which could request and receive funding.<sup>72</sup> (This was one of the instances in which TAF had to seed a local initiative.) TAF allocated over \$60,000 to create a film studio and lab stocked with modern equipment imported from Hollywood, including a 35mm Mitchell camera capable of recording synchronized sound and Korea’s first automatic film-developing

machine.<sup>73</sup> The KMPCA had the job of managing the studio and renting out the equipment to all interested commercial producers. The Chǒngnǔng studio, as it came to be known, began operations in late 1956 as one of the country's first three commercial studios and immediately came into heavy use. The automatic developing machine, which instantly improved films' quality, proved particularly attractive and by 1958 was in operation twenty-four hours a day.<sup>74</sup>

The Seoul office nudged the Korean film industry in a cosmopolitan direction by underwriting its participation in the Asian Film Festival throughout the 1950s. It encouraged the Korean Motion Picture Producers Association to apply for membership in the Federation of Motion Picture Producers Association of Asia (FPA), smoothed the way for the application's quick approval, and made dollars available to pay the association's membership dues.<sup>75</sup> It enabled Korea to send large delegations to the festival by paying the expenses for select members, and it provided one of its staffers, Cho Tongjae, to act as translator and guide.<sup>76</sup> It even worked with foundation representatives in host cities to ensure Korean delegations were accorded a positive reception.<sup>77</sup> As a result of these efforts, at least nine Korean films screened at the Asian Film Festival between 1957 and 1960, with three winning prizes.<sup>78</sup> Through TAF's efforts, the festival became an important venue for forging professional ties between Korean filmmakers and their colleagues across "free Asia" and an incomparable platform for making Korea visible to other democratic nations.

The Asia Foundation's support for Korean cinema was its most successful film project in Asia. At the national level, the KMPCA studio contributed to the notable improvement in film quality and the rapid increase in film production—from 8 films in 1954 to 108 films in 1959—that marked the birth of Golden Age cinema.<sup>79</sup> At the international level, the Seoul office stimulated the exhibition of Korean films at festivals in "free Asia," Western Europe, and the United States. The Asia Foundation thus helped make high-quality commercial Korean films more visible within and beyond the nation's borders.

### YI PYŎNGIL'S *THE WEDDING DAY*

In the case of Korea, the Asian Film Festival worked exactly as the Asia Foundation had planned: it stimulated Korean filmmakers to make higher-quality pictures with the aim of being accepted into the festival and winning prizes. Yi Pyŏngil's *The Wedding Day* gave the Korean film industry its first international success when it won the prize for best comedy in 1957. With this film, Yi satisfied TAF's ambitions for Korean cinema and Korean culture more generally. He gave form to the kind of cosmopolitan sensibility TAF was promoting, one that displayed Korean national tradition via a sophisticated, modern style.

*The Wedding Day* is a period film about a social-climbing minor *yangban* who arranges the marriage of his daughter into a higher-status family. When the



unscrupulous father (Kim Sūngho) hears a rumor that his future son-in-law (Ch'oe Hyōn) is disabled, he substitutes the family maid (Cho Miryōng) for his beloved daughter (Kim Yuhūi). In a twist, the young man is revealed to be healthy, so the honorable maid gets a rich and handsome husband while the selfish daughter gets nothing. The film generates comedy from the father's grasping aspirations and the maid's decent behavior. *The Wedding Day's* festival success in the symbolically significant location of Tokyo boosted the national pride of the Korean people and the morale of the film industry.<sup>80</sup>

The Asia Foundation was instrumental in *The Wedding Day's* success. Two KMPCA board members made the film: O Yōngjin, who wrote the script based on a play he wrote in 1942, and Yi Pyōngil, who produced and directed.<sup>81</sup> O and Yi were precisely the kind of worldly people TAF regarded as capable of "managing the adaptation" of Western ideas for Korean use. Yi Pyōngil began his film career during the colonial era, working at the Nikkatsu studio in Tokyo between 1934 and 1940 before returning to Korea to direct his own film, *Spring in the Korean Peninsula* (1941). After liberation, he worked for a company that made newsreels for the US military government (1945–1948) and thus likely knew TAF program director James Stewart and representative Philip Rowe from their days with USIS. In 1948, Yi moved to the United States for two years to study film at the University of Southern California, where he learned the conventions of classical Hollywood cinema; he spent the Korean War years in Japan, returning to Korea 1954. He joined the KMPCA board as a founding member in 1956 and resumed his directing career with *The Wedding Day* that same year. In 1958, the Seoul office gave him funds to attend the Asian Film Festival in Manila.<sup>82</sup>

O Yōngjin had a deeper relationship with the Asia Foundation. A prominent intellectual, O was a classic Cold War entrepreneur who translated his personal experiences with communism into a professionally advantageous relationship with TAF.<sup>83</sup> Born in Pyongyang, O lived in North Korea for two years before fleeing to the South in 1947. A writer and publisher of anticommunist works, as well as president of the refugee-based North Korean Cultural Association, O helped TAF's Tokyo office forge contacts with Korean cultural organizations in advance of the establishment of the Seoul office. Charles Tanner, TAF's Hollywood liaison at the San Francisco headquarters and a former USIS editor in Seoul, valued O for his combination of life experience and literary skill: he had "lived through communist oppression" and was able to make "a substantial contribution to the post-invasion development of the culture of [his] country."<sup>84</sup> Like Yi Pyōngil, O spent time in the United States. He received a State Department Leaders Grant in 1953–54 that allowed him to spend three months visiting cultural institutions and universities and meeting people in the worlds of theater, film, and radio; in 1959, TAF's Seoul office financed his participation in Henry Kissinger's Harvard International Seminar. The Seoul representatives supported his magazine *Literature and the Arts*, awarded its Freedom Literature Award to a book he published, and

tried to find an American publisher for his own memoir about life under communism. In subsequent years, TAF fostered his intellectual engagement with the “free world” by providing him with subscriptions to *Far East Film News* (an industry publication based in Tokyo), the liberal *New Leader* (published in New York), and the anti-Stalinist *Commentary* (which was associated with New York Intellectuals). O was a cosmopolitan intellectual who possessed the interpersonal and linguistic skills to work easily with Americans, and he developed close personal relationships with Asia Foundation staff. Of Philip Rowe, the first Seoul representative, O effused that he was a “cosmopolitan with a wide vision.”<sup>85</sup> Jack E. James, a later representative, returned the compliment when he wrote of O, “I do not think we could find anyone who represents so well the intellectual, creative Koreans or who can speak of their problems so well.”<sup>86</sup> O was just the type of worldly intellectual TAF was looking for: James wrote, “[O is] one of the few Korean intellectuals . . . who is attempting to understand where Korea stands in relation to the cultural community of the world and what are the best contributions she can make to that community.”<sup>87</sup>

The Asia Foundation particularly valued O’s film experience. O subsidized his publishing ventures by importing foreign films and so was well connected in Korean film circles. When TAF began considering aid to the Korean film industry in 1953, O consulted with Charles Tanner in San Francisco, and his grim report did much to persuade Blum that action was necessary. O also worked with the USIS, writing and producing Kim Kiyōng’s first feature film, *Boxes of Death* (1955), and successfully petitioning Philip Rowe for a \$7,000 loan to complete production.<sup>88</sup> Like Yi Pyōngil, O joined the KMPCA as a founding board member in 1956 and in 1958 received funds to attend the Asian Film Festival in Manila, where he served as a judge.<sup>89</sup>

When it screened in Tokyo, *The Wedding Day* made Korean national culture visible to non-Koreans in the ways the Asia Foundation hoped cultural exports would do. Together, Yi and O created a period film that offered a quasi-anthropological display of Korea’s cultural heritage. The large cast allowed for the display of a diverse array of traditional clothing, from the wide-brimmed horsehair hats and striped *hanbok* worn by elites to the simple white suits of laborers. The movement of family members through the house, which functioned as the film’s primary setting, revealed a Confucian architectural style structured around the spatial separation of men and women. Each of these spaces, in turn, displayed traditional arts and handicrafts, from the mother-of-pearl wardrobes in the women’s room to the landscape paintings and reed-thin smoking pipes in the men’s room. The father’s machinations reveal a hierarchical, patriarchal family system whose older male members must be consulted about all important decisions. As the marriage plot moves forward, it brings to life elaborate customs, including ritualized visits and the bestowing of expensive gifts. The pairing of maid and daughter, in turn, enables a pointed contrast between the daily life of a servant, which includes washing dishes in a river, and that of a young lady, which includes

playing on a traditional standing swing while surrounded by friends (a scene that evokes Chosun-era genre paintings such as Sin Yunbok's depiction of the *tano* festival). While Yi and O's display of indigenous culture overlapped with TAF's ideological interests, it also represented sound commercial judgment: the global success of *Rashomon* (1950) had persuaded many Asian filmmakers that displays of local culture offered the best route into international film festivals and foreign markets. With its ethnographic veneer, *The Wedding Day* hit its mark in Tokyo: after watching the film at the Asian Film Festival, Donald Richie, an American reviewer at the *Japan Times*, praised it for speaking in a "national accent" that distinguished it from the many other festival entries he found depressingly "Hollywood-like."<sup>90</sup> Richie's influential praise was circulated within Korea by none other than Han Hyōngmo, who repeated it in a newspaper article he wrote about the festival.<sup>91</sup>

*The Wedding Day*'s emphasis on Korean tradition was offset, however, by the universality of its theme and the modernity of its technique. While the film's *mise-en-scene* and social world were specific to Korea, O's screenplay tells a fable-like story about the pitfalls of greed that translated easily across cultures. The film's emphasis on tradition was balanced by the technological modernity of its production. At a time when many Korean filmmakers struggled to produce clear images and sounds, Yi achieved remarkably high production values. From one scene to the next, the shots were sharply focused, the film stock captured a full range of tones, lighting was used expressively, dialogue was clearly enunciated, and at key moments an orchestral score filled the soundtrack. Technically, the film looked as good as those produced by more advanced industries, a fact Donald Richie also noted when he compared it favorably to more "technically amateurish" entries.<sup>92</sup> The film's cinematic grammar was also modern, insofar as Yi moved away from colonial-era Japanese conventions and towards the classical Hollywood norms that he learned in California and that were fast becoming the global norm. This stylistic shift becomes visible if one compares two of Yi's films. His colonial-era production, *Spring in the Korean Peninsula*, featured the long takes, slow editing pace, and preference for long and medium shots common to Japanese films of that period. It also included shots that struggled to stay in focus. *The Wedding Day*, in contrast, includes a more dynamic editing rhythm, frequent use of shot/reverse shot patterns to depict conversations, and regular close-ups to create narrative and emotional emphases. The film's universal theme, high production values, and Hollywood-inflected style balanced its cultural specificity and ensured it would be legible to viewers outside Korea.

The Asia Foundation directly enabled the production and festival exhibition of *The Wedding Day*. As a KMPCA board member, Yi Pyōnggil likely used the KMPCA's new sound stage, camera, and lighting equipment during filming, and he processed the footage with their automatic developing equipment, all of which contributed to the film's high technical quality.<sup>93</sup> Such technical improvement of noncommunist commercial cinema was, of course, the central goal of

TAF's entire Asian film program. After the film was accepted into the Asian Film Festival, Yi Pyŏngil successfully petitioned representative Laurence Thompson for funds to have it subtitled in English.<sup>94</sup> These subtitles were essential to the film's festival success, according to staffer Cho Tongjae, because they made it "really understandable to the foreign audience," including the jury members who awarded the film its prize.<sup>95</sup> The winning of this prize marked the high point of the festival for the members of the Korean delegation, whose attendance was heavily subsidized by the Seoul office.<sup>96</sup> The film's success in Tokyo led to an invitation from the Berlin Film Festival, where it was deemed a "sensation," as well as invitations to festivals in Sydney and Edinburgh.<sup>97</sup> *The Wedding Day* also attracted the attention of commercial film importers in Japan, Hong Kong, and the Philippines, causing Korean newspapers to proclaim that this could be the "first time that a Korean film is sold on the overseas market through regular channels."<sup>98</sup> Cho Tongjae, who served as translator and guide for the delegation in Tokyo, reported that the film's success was encouraging Korean producers to think beyond the domestic market and to consider making films for international audiences—which was yet another major TAF objective.<sup>99</sup>

*The Wedding Day* thus stands as one exemplary instance of Cold War cosmopolitanism: it made Korea knowable to the "free world" as a nation with a rich cultural heritage that was on the road to modernization. For representative Jack James, its success in Tokyo validated TAF's entire film program in Korea.<sup>100</sup>

### HAN HYŎNGMO'S *BECAUSE I LOVE YOU*

Han Hyŏngmo's *Because I Love You* offers a different example of Cold War cosmopolitanism. Like *The Wedding Day*, *Because I Love You* made Korean national culture visible to international audiences and thus contributed to TAF's goal of making Korea understood abroad. Han's film was more thoroughly cosmopolitan than Yi's, however: it also told a cosmopolitan story and was created through a cosmopolitan mode of production. Han's film received less direct help from TAF than did *The Wedding Day*. Instead, the film allows us to see how the Asian Film Festival, with TAF's active assistance, was creating a regional film culture that helped shape the development of postwar Korean cinema. Han's energy as a Cold War entrepreneur was directed less toward the Asia Foundation itself and more towards the regional festival it supported.

Like Yi Pyŏngil and O Yŏngjin, Han Hyŏngmo was a logical figure to make a Cold War cosmopolitan film, albeit for different reasons. Han was one of the most prominent directors of the 1950s and early 1960s, widely admired for his experiments with new technologies and his adaptations of Hollywood genres. While Han made war films and anticommunist films, he specialized in well-crafted women's pictures that grappled with contemporary social issues, often through

the lens of sexuality. Han's most celebrated film, *Madame Freedom* (1956), used the scandalous story of a middle-class woman's extramarital affair to explore the liberalization of postwar society and in doing so became one of Korea's first postwar blockbusters. Han's films often had a progressive dimension, featuring female characters who had professional careers or resisted wifely submission at a time when such women were socially rare. Because of his commercial success, Han, unlike Yi Pyŏngil and O Yŏngjin, did not look to the Asia Foundation for much assistance. While his aesthetic and political sensibilities harmonized with TAF's objectives, Han developed them independently and expressed them in films made before as well as after the opening of the Seoul office. Rather, it was through the Asian Film Festival that TAF's cosmopolitan agenda indirectly shaped Han's film.

Han Hyŏngmo participated regularly in the festival. He was a member of the delegations to Hong Kong in 1956 and Tokyo in 1957, and his films screened in competition in Manila in 1958 and in Kuala Lumpur in 1959. Han shared TAF's view of the festival as a spur to the fledgling Korean industry, and in 1956 he praised it as an "impetus" to improving the technical quality of Korean films and to making films that would be acceptable from an "international point of view" and thus able to compete at international festivals.<sup>101</sup> Han also possessed a commercial sensibility that meshed with TAF's interest in entertainment rather than social critique. This became apparent in 1958, when officials at the Ministry of Culture and Education rejected the selection of Kim Sodong's neorealist film *The Money* (1958) as the country's official festival entry on the grounds that it "portrayed the wretched and dismal state of Korea."<sup>102</sup> They replaced it with Han's *Hyperbolae of Youth* (1956), a quasi-musical romantic comedy that acknowledged Korea's social problems but imagined their relatively painless solution via a pair of cross-class weddings. *Because I Love You's* receipt of an award for choreography in 1959 marked the apex of Han's relationship with the festival.

*Because I Love You* tells a decidedly cosmopolitan story. The film opens with the return of a young newspaper reporter (Yun Ilbong) from Malaysia, where he has fallen in love with a local dancer (Landi Chang). He informs his widowed mother (Kim Sunsŏng), a well-known performer of traditional Korean dance, that she and her daughter (Sŏ Aeja), along with the rest of their dance troupe, have been invited to Singapore in a cultural exchange sponsored by his newspaper. The mother initially refuses to go, as it would be too painful a reminder of her late husband (Kim Chin'gyu), also a dancer, who died in Malaysia during World War II after being conscripted into the Japanese imperial army. She later relents, and the three family members travel to Singapore. During her big performance at the National Theater in Singapore, the mother sees her presumed-dead husband in the audience and collapses on stage. When everyone gathers around her bedside, the husband reveals his story: he was wounded during the war and nursed back to health by a Chinese-Malayan woman (Chen Yan), whom he married out of

gratitude. Together they had a daughter, who has now become a dancer. With a shock, the journalist and his girlfriend discover they are half-siblings and thus cannot marry. The two wives later decide between themselves with which family the husband should live. The Chinese-Malayan wife is willing to give him up, but at the last moment the Korean wife decides he should stay in Singapore. In the final scene, the Korean mother, son, and daughter drive away to the airport as the Korean husband and his Chinese-Malayan wife and daughter tearfully wave goodbye.

Han Hyōngmo was known for making films that captured Seoul's zeitgeist, and *Because I Love You* was no exception: it animated several of the cosmopolitan ideals TAF was working so hard to instill among Korean cultural producers. Its story about Koreans travelling to Malaysia, a fellow member of "free Asia," resonated with TAF's vigorous promotion of international travel. The film visually reinforced the theme of travel by setting scenes inside and alongside a commercial airplane. Screenwriter Pak Sōnggho wrote dialogue, often rather blunt, that expanded travel's significance by imbuing it with the bloc-affirming value of international friendship so often invoked by Blum and others. "My trip to the different countries in Southeast Asia made me realize how much they care about Korea," observes the journalist. "They all have hope for our independence and prosperity."<sup>103</sup> Han gave the ideal of international friendship visual expression in a scene set at the Singapore International Airport, where he staged an enthusiastic group of Malaysians greeting the Korean visitors with welcome banners and Korean flags. Pak's script expanded the rhetoric of friendship by invoking family ties as a metaphor for relations among "free Asian" nations. An early version of the script established this metaphor by having the son remark upon his return from "our China" that "interacting with the Taiwanese is just like interacting with siblings."<sup>104</sup> The film goes on to literalize this metaphor with the revelation of the father's bigamy and the realization by the young lovers that they are half-siblings. At a stroke, the character system is transformed into a multiethnic, multinational Korean-Chinese-Malayan family that contains two binational romantic relationships and one multiethnic character. TAF's metaphor of cultural "cross-fertilization" here becomes biological. The costuming visualizes the cosmopolitan nature of this family, as its members wear traditional and modern Korean *hanbok*, Western suits and dresses, and Malaysian dresses and tunics, as well as a Japanese military uniform. In the end, the film sustains the binational marriage of the Korean husband and his Chinese-Malayan wife rather than the nationally homogenous Korean-Korean marriage. The Cold War thematics of international travel, friendship, and family formation overwrite the World War II backstory of colonial exploitation and suffering, which is presented via flashback. The son renders this process of historical progression explicit through frequent exhortations to his mother to forget the past and embrace new opportunities in the present.

In addition to travel and international friendship, the film highlights the theme of cultural exchange, another of TAF's core objectives. Pak wrote multiple small

acts of cultural exchange into the script, as when the Korean mother gives the Malaysian family a *hanbok*-clad Korean doll, and when the Malaysian mother, in turn, offers the journalist son a “local Southeast Asian delicacy” to eat. Beyond these gestures, the young lovers embrace each other’s culture more fully in anticipation of their marriage, as when the Chinese-Malayan dancer dresses in a *hanbok* to meet her future in-laws and the Korean journalist is revealed as being able to speak Mandarin like “a Chinese person.”<sup>105</sup>

Most important, the film places the export of traditional Korean culture at the center of its plot. By doing so in combination with its international family narrative, the film literalizes TAF’s mission “to assist Koreans to bring their cultural achievements . . . to the attention of other members of the free world family of nations.”<sup>106</sup> Again, Pak’s bluntly written dialogue makes this export motif explicit, as when the son appeals to his mother’s nationalist sentiments in urging her to undertake the trip to Singapore. “Mother,” he says, “for all these years you’ve devoted yourself to preserving Korean dance for the next generation, and at the same time worked to introduce Korean dance to the world. This upcoming goodwill visit to Singapore is for the glory of our country.”<sup>107</sup> His appeal succeeds, and the mother agrees to the trip “for the sake of the nation.”<sup>108</sup> Han stages this cultural export via extensive dance performances, which take up about half the film’s running time.<sup>109</sup> The display of traditional dance begins even before the story itself commences: according to Pak’s script, the credit sequence features a group of Korean girls “vividly expressing the uniqueness of Korean folk culture” through their performance of a fan dance.<sup>110</sup> Later scenes revolve around extended dance performances, including one set to the folk song “Arirang” and another based on the folk tale “Ch’unhyang.”<sup>111</sup>

The film turns these nationalist displays of Korean culture into a full-blown international exchange by balancing them with equivalent performances of Chinese and Malaysian dance. The journalist, for example, falls in love with the young dancer while watching her perform an ethnic Uygher dance from China’s far west Xinjiang province. She later performs a traditional Malaysian candle dance, and the climactic show, billed as a Grand Sino-Korean Dance Performance, shows her performing a Chinese chopsticks dance. As it does with travel, Pak’s screenplay associates cultural exchange with free-world integration, as when the Korean mother observes, “I hope our dance exchange program will enhance the friendship between our two countries.”<sup>112</sup> Through dialogue, acts of gift giving, and scenes of dance, then, the film’s content represented the growth of mutual understanding among “free Asian” people TAF hoped the Asian Film Festival as a whole would promote.

Significantly, the film extended this logic of cultural exchange to include its spectators, as well. One of Han’s distinctive traits as a director was his love of spectacle. He liked to give his viewers a good entertainment value, so he packed his films with visual displays of music, dance, fashion, and consumer goods. This tendency towards spectacle continued in *Because I Love You*. Many, if not all, of

the dance scenes were staged in a spectacular, presentational mode that reproduced the staged performance experienced by the characters. For Korean viewers, the presentations of Korean dance appealed to national pride, while the spectacles of Chinese and Malaysian dance offered glimpses of a foreign culture. For festival viewers in Kuala Lumpur and overseas Chinese audiences generally, the exact opposite was true, as the Korean dances introduced them to an exotic traditional art form. The film was thus an *act of* cultural exchange as much as a representation of it. Similarly, the film extended to its viewers some of the pleasures of international travel enjoyed by its characters, specifically the viewing of new scenery. Again deploying a spectacle-based style, the film put Korea's most famous architectural landmarks on display. Han staged a sequence of scenes set at the Ch'ang-dökkung and Kyöngbökkung palaces, as well as at an unspecified temple, in which the *hanbok*-clad Korean dancers pose for publicity photographs. (Stills from these scenes were used to market the film.) Like the displays of Korean dance, these scenes of famous landmarks were balanced by parallel sequences showcasing the bustling streets of Singapore and the lush Malaysian countryside.

It was this display of traditional culture that so appealed to the jury at the Asian Film Festival in Kuala Lumpur in 1959 and led it to bestow a special award for choreography upon the film. The Korean judge, a professor at Ewha Women's University, emphasized the value of tradition when he noted that while films from other countries also included dance, many of these were "too Westernized" and thus not worthy of special recognition.<sup>113</sup> As happened with *The Wedding Day*, this display of traditional Korean culture led directly to further festival exhibition—again, an important objective of the Asian Foundation—when *Because I Love You* was invited to screen in a film festival in West Germany in 1959.<sup>114</sup> The film thus introduced the culture of "free" Korean, Chinese, and Malaysian people to "free" German people.

*Because I Love You* also satisfied TAF's cosmopolitan criteria through its mode of production. It was one of Korea's first international coproductions, a collaboration between Im Hwasu's Korean Entertainment Company, which initiated the project, and Wong Cheuk-hon's Liberty Film Company of Hong Kong.<sup>115</sup> Both industries contributed personnel, with actors from Korea playing alongside those from Hong Kong. Korea's Pak Sönggho wrote the screenplay and Han Hy-öngmo served as cinematographer and one of two editors, as well as director.<sup>116</sup> Intended as a prestige production aimed at both the Korean and Southeast Asian markets, the movie was filmed in multiple countries: primary shooting took place in Hong Kong's Wah Tat studio, with additional location shooting in Seoul and possibly Singapore and Malaysia.<sup>117</sup> Im Hwasu, a wealthy Korean producer and exhibitor, provided a lavish production budget, part of which went towards renting a commercial airplane for use as a set, as well as a mansion to house the cast and crew and two Jaguars to deliver food to the studio. Hong Kong producer Wong Cheuk-hon, in turn, assembled the Chinese cast and crew, rented the Wah Tat studio, and managed the logistics of shooting in Hong Kong; he also distributed the film in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia.<sup>118</sup>



This cosmopolitan mode of production must be seen in relation to developments within the Korean film industry, the Hong Kong industry, and the Asian Film Festival, each of which valued cross-border cooperation for distinct reasons. *Because I Love You* was one in a series of Korean-Hong Kong coproductions initiated by Im Hwasu in 1957 with *Love with an Alien*. Known as something of a right-wing thug, Im had close ties to Syngman Rhee and worked to bring Korean film culture into alignment with Cold War ideology, pressuring artists to attend Rhee's rallies and later producing the state-funded election film *Syngman Rhee and the Independence Movement* (1959).<sup>119</sup> Im valued coproductions as an opportunity for Korean technicians to work with Hong Kong's advanced equipment and as a way to penetrate overseas markets; he also believed they would lead to closer "friendships" with fellow noncommunist nations.<sup>120</sup> Screenwriter Pak Sŏnggho shared this politicized view of coproductions and regarded *Because I Love You* as a chance to work with the "free people" of Hong Kong to "maintain the anticommunist front line together." An expansive nationalist, Pak viewed the production as an opportunity for Koreans to stop living like "frogs in a well" and broaden their vision of the world, which he saw as a first step towards securing "the entire world" as a market for Korean films.<sup>121</sup> For Hong Kong producer Wong Cheuk-hon, coproductions offered fresh sources of capital to offset the loss of the mainland Chinese market in 1952 and the effects of currency restrictions in Taiwan in 1955. He was particularly interested in films set in the "free" territories of Southeast Asia, as he sought to expand into these markets. Wong also shared Im's anti-communist political orientation, and he cast the president of a pro-Taiwan nationalist film organization in a minor role.<sup>122</sup> It is thus no surprise that Wong responded enthusiastically to Im's invitation to collaborate, signing a contract within twenty-four hours.<sup>123</sup>

As much as it was shaped by the needs of the Korean and Hong Kong film industries, *Because I Love You's* status as a coproduction was also shaped by the Asian Film Festival—and this is where we can see the Asia Foundation's indirect influence. Im Hwasu may have planned the film with an eye toward the upcoming Asian Film Festival in Kuala Lumpur: initially set in Korea and Taiwan, the story's overseas location was changed to Singapore and Malaysia, perhaps in an effort to curry favor with the festival's hosts. Han Hyŏngmo certainly had the festival in mind during production. According to screenwriter Pak, Korea's inability to win a prize at the 1958 festival—which one critic bemoaned as a "humiliating failure"—was much on the mind of the Korean crew as they shot the film, goading them to take special care with their work.<sup>124</sup> TAF's direct involvement with the film was limited but intimately connected to its cosmopolitan mode of production: in August 1958, the Seoul office gave the Korean Entertainment Company US\$1,000 in exchange for hwan, specifically to enable location shooting in Kuala Lumpur.<sup>125</sup>

Jack James's decision to assist the film was in keeping with TAF's overall enthusiasm for international coproductions, which it had been encouraging since 1952 as a local initiative that aligned with US interests. TAF saw coproductions as one of

the best means for achieving several of its goals, including the transfer of knowledge from more to less developed film industries, improvement in production values, an increase in regional film exports, the growth of mutual understanding among “free” Asian peoples, and the orientation of Asia’s film industries towards the West. TAF’s work on behalf of coproductions began in the Tokyo office, where Noel Busch and John Miller assisted Japanese producers who were eager to partner with Hollywood for their own reasons. Soon thereafter, Charles Tanner began meeting with Hollywood studio heads, producers, and directors to encourage coproductions from that end as well. After the Asian Film Festival’s launch in 1954, TAF looked to it as the preferred instrument for promoting coproductions, enthusiastically supporting the FPA’s initiatives in this area. The movement towards coproductions gained momentum in 1956. At the festival in Hong Kong (which Han Hyōngmo attended), FPA members passed a resolution encouraging coproductions and instituted a series of professional forums, suggested by TAF, in which they could be discussed. That same year, TAF proposed approving “travel grant requests from young Asian industries to enable them to participate in coproductions with, for example, more advanced Asian industries”; two years later, *Because I Love You* benefitted from a similar currency-exchange grant. The push for coproductions continued at the 1957 festival in Tokyo (which Han also attended), after which John Miller applauded the rising number of such projects as the festival’s most promising result. (This was the year Im launched his series of Korea-Hong Kong collaborations.) In 1958 (the year in which *Because I Love You* was made), TAF reminded all its representatives that coproductions contributed to the achievement of foundation goals and urged them to support the Asian Film Festival in whatever ways they could. By the 1959 Asian Film Festival in Kuala Lumpur (at which *Because I Love You* was awarded its prize), Asia Foundation staffer Cho Tongjae reported that he was “amazed at the demonstration of kinship and friendliness by the Hong Kong and Free Chinese delegates toward Korean attendants” as a result of coproductions undertaken in the previous year. The growth of “friendliness” among “free Asian” nations was, of course, a major TAF goal and a major theme of *Because I Love You*. In life, as in Han’s film, the metaphorical ties of kinship among Asian people sometimes became literal: Cho couldn’t help but mention that the participants in one coproduction “became so friendly that one of the Hong Kong actresses bore a baby of a Korean actor.”<sup>126</sup>

As a coproduction with a Hong Kong company, *Because I Love You* was one of the first Korean films to get commercial distribution in Southeast Asia, a core TAF objective shared with the film’s producers. Two distinct versions of the film were released, each tailored to a different market. The Korean-language version, titled *Because I Love You* and edited by Han Hyōngmo, presented the World War II-era scenes in flashback and was released in Seoul in December 1958.<sup>127</sup> Im Hwasu entered this version into the Asian Film Festival as an exclusively Korean production under the title *Love for You*. The Mandarin-language version, also titled *Love for You*, was edited by Chiang Hsing-lung and presented the story events in chronological order.<sup>128</sup> The marketing material for this version capitalized on

the Asian Film Festival award while downplaying Korean involvement and highlighting the display of Chinese and Malaysian dance. It localized the film by treating it as a star-making vehicle for the Singapore-born Landi Chang and identifying her as a “renowned Southeast Asian dancer.”<sup>129</sup> Aimed at the Southeast Asian market, it opened in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, and Hong Kong in the fall of 1959 and across Malaysia in 1960 and 1961.<sup>130</sup> The film thus delivered its cosmopolitan message to one of the audiences TAF was most concerned about—overseas Chinese—at a fraction of the cost of the elaborate Asia Pictures project in Hong Kong. (The ambiguity surrounding the film’s national identity persists in the present day: the entry for the film in the Korean Film Archives database makes no mention of the Hong Kong producing partner, cast, or crew; the catalog entry in the Hong Kong Film Archive, in turn, makes no mention of the Korean producing partner.)

While downplaying its status as a coproduction, the marketing materials for both the Korean and Hong Kong versions emphasized the film’s cosmopolitan story and its international filming locations. Malaysia figured prominently in reviews as a setting for the story and a filming location, with one Hong Kong article breathlessly claiming that “the filming crew travelled over 5,000 kilometers to capture the distinct scenery and landmarks for the big screen.” Korean reviewers, while often lukewarm about the film as a whole, praised the cultural exchange motif. One noted that the film was “saved” through its inclusion of the “sentiments of Malaysia,” while another noted approvingly that the filmmakers did “seem to have put a lot of effort into capturing the exotic scenery down there.” Another, picking up on the travel and international friendship themes, astutely noted that the film looked best “if thought of as a Korea-Malaysia friendship tourist film.” As a “touristy” film, *Because I Love You* offered a vicarious trip to a fellow “free Asian” country, a broadening experience reviewers welcomed.<sup>131</sup>

*Because I Love You* deserves to be read as a Cold War film because of the many ways it embodies the cosmopolitan impulses and aesthetics of the period. In its story, characters, themes, settings, mode of production, distribution, and reception, the film foregrounds the possibilities for substantive engagement with other “free” people in Asia and the West. And like *The Wedding Day*, it educated “free-world” audiences about Korea’s distinct national culture. Han’s film thus harmonized with the bloc-building and nation-building efforts of the Asia Foundation, even as it benefitted from its direct and indirect support.

## CONCLUSION

This article has been an effort to expand our understanding of the cultural Cold War in Asia. It has illuminated the Asia Foundation’s modus operandi of nurturing indigenous initiatives that were in harmony with Washington’s efforts to bind together “free Asia.” It has charted the foundation’s role in supporting the dual projects of nation building and bloc building by showing how TAF encouraged the production of films with both national and cosmopolitan storylines and facilitated

their exhibition at international film festivals. By exploring *The Wedding Day* and *Because I Love You* in some depth, this essay has also revealed some of the consequences, both aesthetic and material, of the Asia Foundation's interventions in the cultural fields of Korea and Asia more generally. It has provided some insight into the creativity and entrepreneurial ambitions of Korean cultural producers as they availed themselves of the foundation's resources and responded to its incentives.

This article has also argued that Cold War cosmopolitanism constituted a significant discourse within postwar Korean culture, one encouraged by the Asia Foundation and produced by Korean artists. This worldly sensibility and body of practices was hardly unique to Korea and can be found in other Golden Age cinemas that flourished across the "free world" from the late 1940s through the 1960s, including in Japan, Hong Kong, Italy, and Mexico—whose film industries also took advantage of resources proffered by US agencies. Like America's Cold War Orientalism, this Cold War cosmopolitanism appealed to cultural producers and consumers across the "free world" who understood themselves to be participants in the great transformations of the postwar period.

## NOTES

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2. Steven Chung, *Split Screen Korea*; Hye Seung Chung and David Scott Diffrient, *Movie Migrations*.

3. Charles K. Armstrong, "The Cultural Cold War in Korea"; Han Sang Kim, "Cold War and the Contested Identity Formation"; Kim, "My Car Modernity"; Poshek Fu, "The Politics of Entertainment."

4. Sangjoon Lee, "The Asia Foundation's Motion Picture Project"; Lee, "Creating an Anti-Communist Motion Picture Producers' Network"; Lee, "On John Miller's 'The Korean Film Industry'"; Lee, "The Emergence of the Asian Film Festival"; Michael Baskett, "Japan's Film Festival Diplomacy."

5. Sheldon Pollock et al., "Cosmopolitanisms," 10.

6. Christina Klein, *Cold War Orientalism*.

7. Kim, "Cold War and the Contested Identity Formation," 554, 560.

8. Antoinette Burton uses the phrase "Cold War cosmopolitan" in *The Postcolonial Careers of Santha Rama Rau*, 32. See also Chung, *Split Screen Korea*, chapter 2.

9. Frances Stonor Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War*; Charles Leary, "The Most Careful Arrangements"; David H. Price, *Cold War Anthropology*; Kimberly Gould Ashizawa, "The Evolving Role"; Beverly J. Brewster, *American Overseas Library*.

10. Armstrong, "Foundations of Free Asia."
11. George Lerski, "Programming in Plastic, Performing, and Literary Arts," May 18, 1962, p. 4, Folder 7, Box 1, Robert Blum Papers [hereafter RBP].
12. Donna Ong discovered a Chinese-language version of the script while doing research for me in the Hong Kong Film Archive.
13. Central Intelligence Agency (hereafter CIA), "Memorandum, Committee for a Free Asia, Programs and Planning," September 28, 1951, DTPILLAR Vol. 1\_0040. This and all subsequent CIA documents cited in this paper were accessed at <http://archive.org/details/DTPILLAR>.
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16. US Dept. of Defense, NSC 48/1, 253.
17. CIA, "Notification of Project Approval, DTPILLAR, 4 June 1956," DTPILLAR Vol. 2\_0018; CIA, "Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, Fact Sheet: The Asia Foundation," October 8, 1965, DTPILLAR Vol. 3\_0014.
18. CIA, "Memorandum, Committee for a Free Asia, Programs and Planning," September 28, 1951, DTPILLAR Vol.1\_0040.
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21. CIA, "Draft, Committee for a Free Asia," December 13, 1951, DTPILLAR Vol. 1\_0085.
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23. Richard Smith, *OSS*, 151; Price, *Cold War Anthropology*, 176-77.
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30. "Summary of Board of Trustees Meeting," February 11, 1955, Folder 10, Box 1, RBP.
31. "Asian Operations Department, Statement," File: Budget (Allocations and Aps)-1952/53-Japan-Administration, Box P-20, Asia Foundation Records, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University [hereafter AFR].

32. CIA, Lerski, "Programming in Plastic"; "The Committee for a Free Asia," December 21, 1951, DTPILLAR Vol. 1\_0021.

33. CIA, "Second Revised Administrative Plan, Covert Action Staff Proprietary Project DTPILLAR," August 1963, DTPILLAR VOL. 3\_0022.

34. CIA, "Project Outline," March 1955, DTPILLAR Vol. 2\_0029.

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37. It is difficult to determine the Asia Foundation's budget with any certainty. Master budgets are not included in archival records at the Hoover Institution, and the CIA has redacted most of the financial data from its declassified documents. The numbers given here are from an unredacted document: CIA, "Summary Request for Renewal, FY 1958," DTPILLAR Vol. 2\_0009. Victor Marchetti and John Marks claim TAF received a CIA subsidy of \$8 million a year. Marchetti and Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, 172. Hugh Wilford reports that in 1967 the CIA's expenditure on all front organizations was estimated at \$15 million annually. Wilford, *The Mighty Wurlitzer*, 251.

38. CIA, "Second Revised Administrative Plan, Covert Action Staff Proprietary Project DTPILLAR," August 1963, DTPILLAR VOL. 3\_0022.

39. Blum, "Introduction: The Flow of People and Ideas," Folder 7, Box 1, RBP; Lerski, "Programming in Plastic," May 18, 1962, Folder 7, Box 1, RBP; "Korea Program Budget, 1958/59," File: Korea Budget 1957/58, Box P-59, AFR.

40. "Memorandum, Motion Picture Project," July 28, 1953, File: Media-Audio-Visual-Movies-Asia Pictures Correspondence-Hong Kong-Program, Box P-58, AFR.

41. Leary, "The Most Careful Arrangements"; Lee, "The Asia Foundation's Motion Picture Project"; Lee, "Creating an Anti-Communist Motion Picture Producers' Network."

42. The festival launched as the Southeast Asian Film Festival in 1954 and was renamed the Asian Film Festival in 1957 and the Asia-Pacific Film Festival in 1982. I will use the Asian Film Festival throughout this essay.

43. "The Southeast Asian Film Festival," File: Film Festival-FMPPSEA-3rd-Hong Kong-1956-Korea-802-Conferences, Box P-18, AFR; Lee, "The Emergence of the Asian Film Festival"; Lee, "The Asia Foundation's Motion Picture Project."

44. The documentation of TAF's involvement in the Asian Film Festival is voluminous. This paragraph draws from the following AFR records: File: Tokyo-TV-Movies-1953, Box P-9; File: Film Festival-FMPP SEA-Organizational Conf.-Manila, 1953-US & Int.-Conferences, Box P-14; File: Film Festival-FMPPSEA-1st, Japan, 1954-US & International-Conferences, Box P-14; File: Film Festival-FMPPSEA-2nd-Singapore-1955-US & International-Conferences, Box P-15; File: Film Festival FMPPSEA-3rd Hong Kong 1956-Korea 802, Box P-18; File: Media-Audio-Visual-Movies-Seiter, Wm. A.-Hong Kong-Program, Box P-171.

45. John Miller, "Report on First Film Festival in Southeast Asia," May 31, 1954, File: Film Festival-FMPPSEA-1st, Japan, 1954-US & International-Conferences, Box P-14, AFR.

46. "Memorandum, Malayan entry for Asian Film Festival," April 5, 1954, File: Film Festival-FMPPSEA-1st Japan, 1954-US & Int.-Conferences, Box P-14, AFR; "Memorandum, Federation of Motion Picture Producers in Southeast Asia, Organizational Conference," December 16, 1953, File: Film Festival-FMPP SEA-Organizational Conf.-Manila, 1953-US & Int.-Conferences, Box P-14, AFR.

47. Miller, "Recommendations for a CFA, Japan Motion Picture Program," September 11, 1953, File: Tokyo-TV-Movies-1953, Box P-9, AFR; Miller, "Report on First Film Festival," May 31, 1954, File: Film Festival-FMPPSEA-1st-Japan-1954-US & International-Conferences, Box P-14, AFR.

48. Miller, letter to Irving Maas, April 9, 1954, File: Film Festival-FMPPSEA-1st Japan-1954-US & Int.-Conferences, Box P-14, AFR.

49. Lee, "The Asia Foundation's Motion Picture Project"; Lee Iacovoni Sorenson, "In Memorium: Mary Walker Mag Hasse (1911–2007)," *The Forum: Newsletter of the Federation of American Women's Clubs Overseas Inc (2007–2008)*: 2, cited in Lee, "Creating an Anti-Communist motion Picture Producers' Network," 17; Cho Tongjae and Pak T'aejin, *Partner for Change*, 13, 32–34.

50. Lerski, "Programming in Plastic."

51. "Case Study #6: The Committee's Cultural Program in the Republic of Korea," File: General-1952/53-Korea-Program, Box P-61, AFR.

52. "The Asia Foundation Plan for Korea," Oct. 20, 1955, File: General-1954/55-Korea-Program, Box P-61, AFR.

53. "Korea Program Budget 1958/59," File: Korea Budget 1957/58, Box P-59, AFR.

54. Cho and Pak, *Partner for Change*, 13–31.

55. Fu, "The Politics of Entertainment"; Patrick Iber, "Anti-Communist Entrepreneurs."

56. "The Asia Foundation Plan for Korea."

57. "Monthly Report to the Board of Trustees," July, 1955, Folder 10, Box 1, RBP.

58. "Case Study #6, The Committee's Cultural Program."

59. Lerski, "Programming in Plastic."

60. "Korea Program Budget, 1958/59," File: Korea Budget 1957/58, Box P-59, AFR.

61. "The Asia Foundation Plan for Korea."

62. "The Asia Foundation, preface to Program Budget FY 1957–58," File: Korea Budget 1957/58, Box P-59, AFR.

63. "The Asia Foundation Plan for Korea."

64. "Korea Program Budget, 1958/59."

65. "The Asia Foundation Plan for Korea."

66. "International Conferences," File: Budget-AP's & Allocations, etc. 1955/56-Korea-Administrative, Box P-59, AFR; "Proposed Budget for 1957–58," February 1, 1957, File: Budget (Master)-1957–1958-Korea-Administration, Box P-59, AFR.

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68. "Proposed Program Budget for 1957–58," February 1, 1957, File: Budget (Master)-1957–1958-Korea-Administration, Box P-59, AFR; "Memorandum, Korea Budget, 1956–1957," May 2, 1957, File: Korea Budget 1957/58, Box P-59, AFR.

69. "The Asia Foundation Plan for Korea."

70. "Korea Program Budget, 1958–59," File: Korea Budget 1957/58, Box P-59, AFR.

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75. “Memorandum, Korean Motion Picture Producers Association: Asian MPPA Film Festival in Tokyo,” March 7, 1957, File: Media-Audio-Visual-Films-Korean Motion Picture Cultural Association KMPCA I-Korea-Program, Box P-280, AFR.

76. “Approved Project, No. 611,” May 31, 1957, File: Korea Budget 1957/58, Box P-59, AFR.

77. Letter from Masaichi Nagata to Chang Kuo-sin, May 8, 1956, File: Film Festival FMPPSEA-3rd Hong Kong 1956-Korea 802 (Conferences), Box P-18, AFR.

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82. Brian Yecies and Ae-Gyung Shim, *Korea’s Occupied Cinema*, 185, fn. 58; Lee and Choe, *The History of Korean Cinema*, 84; “Han’guk ūi Chyang Kabang Yi Pyŏngil kamdok” [The Jean Gabin of Korea, director Yi Pyŏngil], *Kyŏnghyang sinmun*, December 28, 1961, 4, <http://newslibrary.naver.com/viewer/index.nhn?articleId=1961122800329104006&editNo=3&pprintCoun=1&publishDate=1961-12-28&officeId=00032&pageNo=4&printNo=4937&publishType=00010>; Kim Chongwŏn, *Han’guk yŏnghwa kamdok sajŏn* [The dictionary of Korean film directors], 456–58; “Memorandum, Sixth Annual Film Festival, Kuala Lumpur,” April 10, 1959, File: Film Festival-6th Asian-Kuala Lumpur-1959, Box No. P-93, AFR.

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Media-Publications-Literature & Arts Weekly-Oh Yong-jin-Korea 706-707-Program, Box P-61, AFR.

84. Letter from Charles M. Tanner to O Yǒngjin, March 9, 1954, File: Oh Young-jin-Korea-Individual, Box P-148, AFR.

85. Quoted in Kim Ongnan, “O Yǒngjin kwa pan’gong, Asia, Miguk: Yi Sǔngman chǒn’gigük *Ch’ǒngnyǒn, P’ungun ūl chungsim ūro*” [Oh Youngjin and anticommunism, Asia, America], 17.

86. “Memorandum, Harvard International Seminar, Oh Yung-jin,” March 10, 1959, File: Oh Young-jin-Korea-Individual, Box P-148, AFR.

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88. “Program-Korea,” File: Budget-AP’s & Allocations, etc. 1954/55-Korea-Administrative, Box P-59, AFR.

89. “Korea.”

90. Donald Richie, “4th Asian Film Festival Big Success for the Trade,” *Japan Times*, May 30, 1957, File: Fourth Asian Film Festival-1957-US & Int.-Conferences, Box P-88, AFR.

91. Han Hyǒngmo, “Asea Yǒnghwaje ch’amga sogam” [Impressions of the Asian Film Festival], *Kyǒngnyang sinmun*, June 9, 1957, 4, <http://newslibrary.naver.com/viewer/index.nhn?articleId=1957060900329204001&editNo=1&printCount=1&publishDate=1957-06-09&officeId=00032&pageNo=4&printNo=3635&publishType=00020>.

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93. “Memorandum, General Convention of KMPPA Members,” May 9, 1958, File: Media-Audio-Visual-Films-Korean Motion Picture Cultural Association KMPPA-Reports-Korea-Program, Box P-280, AFR.

94. “Letter from Laurence G. Thompson to Yi Pyǒng-il,” April 24, 1957, File: Media-Audio-Visual-KMPPA General-Korea-Programs, Box P-60, AFR.

95. “Memorandum, Report on the Korean Participation in the 4th Asian Film Festival,” June 18, 1957, File: Fourth Asian Film Festival-1957-US & Int.-Conferences, Box P-88, AFR.

96. “Korea Budget, 1956–57,” May 2, 1957, File: Korea Budget 1957/58, Box P-59, AFR.

97. “*Sijip kanŭn nal tae in’gi*” [*The Wedding Day*, a big hit], *Chosŏn ilbo*, June 29, 1957, 4, <http://www.chosun.com/>; “*Sijip kanŭn nal tae in’gi*” [*The Wedding Day*, a big hit], *Tonga ilbo*, May 25, 1957, 4, <http://newslibrary.naver.com/viewer/index.nhn?articleId=1957052500209204005&editNo=1&printCount=1&publishDate=1957-05-25&officeId=00020&pageNo=4&printNo=10643&publishType=00020>. The film screened at the fifth Sydney Film Festival in 1958: “Sydney Film Festival, 1954 to Now: A Living Archive,” Sydney Film Festival, <http://online.sffarchive.org.au/#folio=1>.

98. “Yǒnghwa ‘*Sijip kanŭn nal*’ Tongnama cheguk e such’ul” [The film *The Wedding Day* to be exported to Southeast Asia], *Kyǒngnyang sinmun*, March 10, 1957, 4.

99. Cho Tongjae, “Report on the Korean Participation in the 4th Asian Film Festival,” June 18, 1957, File: Fourth Asian Film Festival-1957-US & Int.-Conferences, Box P-88, AFR.

100. “Korean Motion Picture Cultural Association,” File: Media-Audio-Visual-Films-Korean Motion Picture Cultural Association KMPPA I-Korea-Program, Box P-280, AFR.

101. Han Hyŏngmo, “Yŏnghwa chejak ūi chase” [Attitude towards film production], *Chosŏn ilbo*, July 9, 1956, 4, <http://www.chosun.com/>.
102. Sang-yong Lee and Ayoung Yang, *Han Hyung-mo*, 21; Pak Chisa, “Chiyang twaeya hal yŏnghwa pip’yŏng” [Film criticism that should be avoided], *Chosŏn ilbo*, May 31, 1958, 4, <http://www.chosun.com/>.
103. Pak Sŏngho, *Because I Love You / Love for You*, Scene 15, Hong Kong Film Archive, call number HB534X.
104. *Ibid.*, Scene 15.
105. *Ibid.*, Scene 40.
106. “Korea Program Budget 1958/59,” File: Korea Budget 1957/58, Box P-59, AFR.
107. Pak, *Because I Love You*, Scene 25.
108. *Ibid.*, Scene 29.
109. Jiang Ming, “A Tragedy with Insufficient Reasoning—About *Love For You*,” *Ta kung pao* [大公報], November 9, 1959, 7.
110. Pak, *Because I Love You*, Prologue.
111. *Ibid.*, Scene 17; *Love for You*, press book, Hong Kong Film Archive call number HB534X.
112. Pak, *Because I Love You*, Scene 32.
113. “Hop’yŏng padŭn uri yŏn’gi” [Our acting receives good reviews], *Sŏul sinmun*, May 16, 1959, 4.
114. *Because I Love You*, KMDB, [http://www.kmdb.or.kr/eng/vod/vod\\_basic.asp?nation=K&p\\_dataid=00418&keyword=%EC%82%AC%EB%9E%91%ED%95%98%EB%8A%94%20%EA%B9%8C%EB%8B%AD%EC%97%90](http://www.kmdb.or.kr/eng/vod/vod_basic.asp?nation=K&p_dataid=00418&keyword=%EC%82%AC%EB%9E%91%ED%95%98%EB%8A%94%20%EA%B9%8C%EB%8B%AD%EC%97%90).
115. Sangjoon Lee discusses the film briefly in his dissertation, and I have drawn on his sources. Lee, “The Transnational Asian Studio System,” 298.
116. *Because I Love You*, KMDB, [http://www.kmdb.or.kr/eng/vod/vod\\_basic.asp?nation=K&p\\_dataid=00418&keyword=%EC%82%AC%EB%9E%91%ED%95%98%EB%8A%94%20%EA%B9%8C%EB%8B%AD%EC%97%90](http://www.kmdb.or.kr/eng/vod/vod_basic.asp?nation=K&p_dataid=00418&keyword=%EC%82%AC%EB%9E%91%ED%95%98%EB%8A%94%20%EA%B9%8C%EB%8B%AD%EC%97%90).
117. Wong Cheuk-hon, *A Life in Film*, 102–3; Pak Sŏngho, “Saenggak nanŭn taero; Hyanghang e wasŏ ch’waryŏng ūl hamyŏ” [Whatever comes to my mind: Filming in Hong Kong], *Kukche yŏnghwa*, November 1958, 48–49.
118. Wong, *A Life in Film* 102–3; “Kuksan yŏnghwa ch’oech’o ro haeoe such’ul” [First domestic film to be exported overseas], *Han’guk ilbo*, April 26, 1959, 5.
119. Brian Yecies and Ae-Gyung Shim, *The Changing Face of Korean Cinema*, 100, fns. 5, 13.
120. Im Hwasu, “Hapchak yŏnghwa ūi ūiŭi” [The significance of coproduction films], *Chosŏn ilbo*, May 28, 1957, 4. <http://www.chosun.com/>; Im Hwasu, “Hapchak yŏnghwa ūi kanŭngsŏng” [The potential of coproduction films], *Chosŏn ilbo*, February 20, 1958, 4, <http://www.chosun.com/>.
121. Pak, “Saenggak nanŭn taero” [Whatever comes to my mind], 48–49.
122. “Sino-Korean Film Cooperation Miscalculate Box Office Earnings,” *United Daily News* (Taiwan), October 20, 1958, 6; Law Kar and Frank Bren, *Hong Kong Cinema*, 201–17; Wang Yuanlong, who plays the director of the Malaysian dance organization, was founder and president of the Hong Kong and Kowloon Filmmakers Free General Association, Ltd.; Donna Ong, personal communication.
123. Wong, *A Life in Film*, 102–3.

124. Pak Chisa, “Chiyang twaeya hal yŏnghwa pip’yŏng” [Film criticism that should be avoided]; Pak, “Saenggak nanŭn taero” [Whatever comes to my mind], 48–49.

125. Letter from Jack E. James to Kim Sungmin, August 11, 1958, File: Media-Audio-Visual-Films-General-Korea-Program, Box P-150, AFR. It is not clear how much, if any, of the film was actually shot in Malaysia.

126. “Memorandum, Attached Motion Picture Project,” January 21, 1953, File: Tokyo-TV-Movies-1953, Box P-9, AFR; “Memorandum, Recommendations for a CFA, Japan Motion Picture Program,” September 18, 1953, File: Tokyo-TV-Movies-1953, Box P-9, AFR; “Memorandum, Trip to Hollywood,” December 31, 1953, File: Writer Project (Japan), Box P-9, AFR; “Southeast Asian Film Festival,” File: Film Festival FMPPSEA-3rd Hong Kong 1956-Korea 802, Box P-18, AFR; “Report on the 4th Asian Film Festival,” June 25, 1957, File: Fourth Asian Film Festival-1957-US & Int.-Conferences, Box P-88, AFR; “Memorandum, Proposed Itinerary for Remainder of Film Advisory and Research Assignment,” February 11, 1957, File: Miller, John (Films)-US and Int.-Individual, Box P-39, AFR; “Memorandum, Fifth Asian Film Festival, Manila,” March 20, 1958, File: Fifth Asian Film Festival-Manila, 1958-US & Int.-Conferences, Box P-90, AFR; Cho Tongjae, “My Personal Impressions of the 6th Asian Film Festival in Kuala Lumpur,” May 19, 1959, File: Film Festival-6th Asian-Kuala Lumpur-1959, Box No. P-93, AFR.

127. Notations in Han’s copy of the script indicate a different scene order for the Korean version.

128. “*Love for You’s* 7 Major Achievements,” *Kung Sheung Evening News* [Commercial evening news] [工商晚報], November 7, 1959, 6. The film was known by other names as well. Liberty Films translated the Mandarin title into English as *Twinkling Stars*, while the Hong Kong Movie Database today lists the film under the title *As Glamorous as the Galaxy*. The film appears in the Asia Foundation documentation as *For Love’s Sake*.

129. “Best Choreography Award Winning Film *Love for You* about to be released,” *Kung Sheung Daily News* [Hong Kong commercial daily] [香港工商日報], November 28, 1959, 11.

130. Based on newspaper articles, advertisements, and reviews.

131. “*Love for You’s* 7 Major Achievements”; “Han-Mare hapchak yŏnghwa *Sarang hanŭn kkadak e*” [Korea-Malaysia coproduction film *Because I Love You*], *Chosŏn ilbo*, December 7, 1958, 4, <http://www.chosun.com/>; “Sin yŏnghwa pyŏng: *Sarang hanŭn kkadak e*” [Reviews of new films: *Because I Love You*], *Kukche yŏnghwa*, January 1959, 100; “Sin yŏnghwa *Sarang hanŭn kkadak e*” [New film: *Because I Love You*], *Sŏul sinmun*, December 12, 1958, 4.

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