

Chapter 7 Immigration and Social Disorder

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I wish someone would tell us how the hell we're supposed to act here!
—Immigrant Leader in Addison, Illinois

If there is one thing that social scientists have learned since the 1960s and then succeeded in passing on to the wider society, it is the importance of the mundane, informal relations of daily life for the healthy functioning of our neighborhoods and institutions. Back in 1961, when urban planners were still buoyed by a professional hubris sustained by the arrogant abstractions of postwar modernism, Jane Jacobs wrote: "The first thing to understand is that the public peace . . . of cities is not kept primarily by the police, necessary as police are. It is kept primarily by an intricate, almost unconscious, network of voluntary controls and standards among the people themselves, and enforced by the people themselves. . . . No amount of police can enforce civilization where the normal, casual enforcement of it has broken down."¹

Twenty years later James Q. Wilson and George Kelling were teaching the same lesson through the example of "broken windows."

More than thirty years later, Robert Putnam sparked a similar national discussion, this time focused on "social capital." In advanced societies the informal, the nonprofessional, and the unofficial are continually being subverted by our commitments to individual rights and bureaucratic accountability; hence, the apparent need to dedicate and rededicate ourselves to the value of what James C. Scott calls "the microsociology of public order."

In *Seeing Like a State*, Scott reminds us that "the establishment and maintenance of social order in large cities are, as we have increasingly learned, fragile achievements."² This fragility is in part traceable to the nonverbal nature of much of the interaction that defines and sustains the social fabric. Close observers of urban neighborhoods, like Gerald Suttles, certainly make this point. So does criminologist Mark H. Moore: "Producing community security depends on having or creating some combination of *shared understandings* about acceptable behavior [emphasis added]."³

Such arrangements—what Jane Jacobs refers to as "eyes on the street"—are also fragile because of their instrumental nature. As sociologist Robert Sampson reminds us, neighborhoods today are not—if they ever were—"urban villages" held together by intense bonds of ethnic solidarity, psychological support, or deep friendship. They are based instead on relationships between neighbors and acquaintances who typically do not know each other well but who rely on one another to sustain norms of civility that result in public goods like trust and safety. In Morris Janowitz's phrase, contemporary neighborhoods are "communities of limited liability."

Sampson also emphasizes that such neighborhoods depend vitally on stability. Political scientist Wesley Skogan makes a similar point in *Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Neighborhoods*, where he reports that "high turnover," particularly in poor neighborhoods, leads to high levels of disorder that undermine the informal relationships that sustain social order. Such findings led Sampson to call for community development policies "that are sensitive to the potentially disruptive forces of neighborhood instability induced by unchecked development."⁴

IMMIGRATION AND THE SOCIAL FABRIC

Professor Sampson does not elaborate on what he means by "unchecked development." But such language typically refers to real estate development, urban renewal, and the like. Yet there is one source of unchecked develop-

ment contributing to substantial instability in American cities that is almost never mentioned: immigration. Just ask any public school teacher or principal who must deal with the continual comings and goings of immigrant children, or any priest or church administrator trying to keep track of parishioners who pledge to tithe to the congregation. There is certainly reason to believe that the current influx of immigrants is putting serious strains on the social fabric of our cities.

Yet these social-order effects of immigration have been widely overlooked. There are several reasons why. The countless casual interactions between neighbors and acquaintances that occur on sidewalks and other public places are, according to Jane Jacobs, “ostensibly utterly trivial”—though she immediately adds that “the sum is not trivial at all.” Such impacts are also difficult to quantify, which has been particularly relevant in a policy area so dominated by economists. And as John Higham, dean of American immigration historians, has emphasized about his own work on nativism, there is a tendency for analysts to focus on the economic sources of opposition to immigration.

Then, too, the debate over immigration has been locked into a compelling, but misleading framework that distinguishes sharply between legal and illegal immigration. Immigrant advocates have resisted this dichotomy and rejected the stigmatization of what they refer to as “undocumented immigrants.” But since the undeniable public anxiety voiced by passage of California’s Proposition 187 in 1994, it has been all but impossible to resist the prevailing paradigm—which assigns all negative outcomes associated with immigration to illegal immigrants, and all benign or positive outcomes to legal immigrants. This formulation may provide cover to politicians and policymakers, but it drastically distorts reality. Certainly, the social-order effects of immigration do not easily fit into this neat legal-illegal dichotomy.

Finally, there is one other reason why these effects have been overlooked and ignored. And this brings us back to “broken windows” and the issue of crime. During the 1960s and 1970s, many analysts and commentators avoided addressing rising crime rates and fears about crime expressed by large numbers of ordinary Americans. At the time it was felt that acknowledging such complaints would be pandering to bigotry and racism and fuel dangerous reaction.

So, too, today many are reluctant to acknowledge any negative effects of immigration. Among the most reluctant are our elites, who happen to benefit from this huge influx of unskilled labor and are at the same time able to

insulate themselves from many of its burdens. As one recently minted Berkeley Ph.D. once challenged me, “How can you talk about the social strains associated with immigration without playing into the hands of right-wing conservatives?” However well-meaning or appealing, such thinking has resulted in policies that ignore the fears and anxieties of millions of Americans about the largest wave of immigration in our history. Unacknowledged and dismissed, such sentiments fester and develop into disaffection, even rage. This is—or at least should be—the lesson of Proposition 187, which sought to deny virtually all public services to illegal immigrants in California. A bad idea whose time had come, Prop 187 was approved by an overwhelming majority in 1994, but was eventually gutted by the federal courts. It appealed to so many Californians because up to that point, no public official would address the growing concerns of ordinary citizens about immigration.

Today, our policymakers and politicians have yet to apply to immigration what we have as a society learned about crime—that the fears and anxieties of ordinary Americans, however poorly expressed or not readily confirmed by available statistics, are not prudently ignored or rejected as irrational paranoia or bigotry. More precisely, we have learned that fears about social disorder are just as important, if not more so, than fears about officially designated crime. Similarly, we must now be attentive to popular fears and anxieties about immigration—legal as well as illegal.

The alternative is more contentious, polarizing battles like that over Proposition 187, or Proposition 227 (curtailing bilingual education in California). Such outbursts help advocacy groups—on all sides of the issue—fill their coffers. But permitting things to reach the boiling point hardly fosters an environment conducive to the making of policies beneficial to immigrants, or to Americans generally. And the fact is that the social-order effects of immigration that concern Americans—whether overcrowded housing, gang-ridden neighborhoods, or unsafe working conditions—are harmful to immigrants as well.

Now, the challenges of refocusing the immigration debate on such quality of life issues should not be underestimated. Not all social disorder among immigrants is attributable directly to them; much is the result of public policy. Nor should disorder be equated with crime; or immigrants stigmatized as criminals. Finally, focusing on the mundane social-order effects of immigration will be especially difficult in this post-September 11 period, in which immigration has been fatefully reframed through the lens of homeland security and terrorism.

IMMIGRATION, CRIME, AND DISORDER

To get behind official crime statistics and explore the differences between common crime and neighborhood disorder, Wesley Skogan and his associates surveyed almost 13,000 adults in forty urban residential neighborhoods across the United States. In ten of these neighborhoods they did field research and interviewed hundreds of residents, organization leaders, merchants, police officers, and local officials. The results were highly suggestive for anyone trying to understand contemporary sources of anxiety about immigration.

Asked to identify social as well as physical sources of disorder, urban residents mentioned, in rough order of frequency: public drinking, corner gangs, street harassment—especially of women and the elderly—drug use and sale, noisy neighbors, commercialized sex, vandalism, dilapidated and abandoned buildings, and trash. Skogan confirms that such signs of disorder are clearly associated with residents' anger, demoralization, and fear. He then emphasizes that "even though disorders are not in themselves life-threatening, fear may be a rational reaction to them."⁵

Strikingly, these and related signs of disorder are highly visible in immigrant neighborhoods and have surfaced as the focus of disputes and controversies between immigrants and nonimmigrants across the United States. In San Bernardino and Riverside counties in Southern California, problems associated with Mexican residents have included crowing roosters that wake up the neighbors. In Waukegan, Illinois, north of Chicago, city officials concerned about overcrowded housing in Mexican immigrant neighborhoods pleased some residents but angered others when fire code enforcement was beefed up. Other Chicago-area municipalities have had difficulties addressing parking problems in overcrowded immigrant neighborhoods. In Los Angeles there has been controversy over trash and health issues involving itinerant immigrant food vendors. In Santa Ana, California, the very urban county seat of very suburban Orange County, police have had to move decisively against enclaves of homeless immigrants living under freeway bridges and near heavily used bicycle paths. Throughout Southern California there have been acrimonious disputes over the noise and exhaust fumes from gasoline-powered leaf blowers used by Mexican immigrant gardeners.

The list could go on, and might also include concerns about high rates of pedestrian accidents in the immigrant neighborhoods of Santa Ana, or high accident rates for Hispanics working in construction in northern Carolina. And while there are multiple factors involved in each of these issues,

none of these are serious crimes, but rather sources of disorder that nevertheless prove bothersome or at times threatening to immigrant and non-immigrant residents.

While these issues often have an ethnic or even racial edge, they don't always. Graciela Diaz is a waitress at a Mexican restaurant in a giant Las Vegas hotel casino. A native of Jalisco, Mexico, who came to the United States illegally, she met her husband, Manuel, when they were both working in a Los Angeles sweatshop. Two years ago the Diazes bought a \$125,000 house in a gated community ten miles north of downtown Las Vegas. Explaining why they left their old neighborhood, Mr. Diaz recently told the *New York Times*: "People from Mexico—I call them *paesanos*—were burning tires. They played radios real loud. I was afraid of Cecilia (their daughter) playing outside, that someone would run her over. Here it's quiet and safe for her."

One issue that involves many of these concerns is day-laborer hiring sites. Go to a Home Depot some morning in almost any part of the United States, and you will find individuals congregating at the edge of the parking lot, waiting to sell their labor to passing homeowners and subcontractors. These *jornaleros* are almost always foreign-born males, overwhelmingly Latino, and usually undocumented. While their services are obviously in demand by some, their very presence frustrates and even frightens many others. While waiting to be hired, these men may drink, urinate in public, or make noises and gestures to women passing by. Sidewalks get littered. Fights and petty crime are often problems. Traffic is tied up, sometimes causing accidents. For their part, workers complain frequently of being cheated out of their wages. And police report that criminals, particularly drug dealers, lurk among day-laborers and ply their trade.

The real challenges arise when local authorities attempt to regulate these sites. The efforts of some municipalities to ban them outright have been successfully challenged in the courts by immigrant advocates. Other jurisdictions have sought to impose order on the incipient chaos by providing services to *jornaleros* and certifying their bona fides and skills to prospective employers. But such efforts are usually not successful, either because the workers are sufficiently independent and entrepreneurial that they are not interested, or because some residents regard such programs as condoning illegal immigration. Caught in these cross-currents, most public officials eventually back off.

THE CASE OF ADDISON

Another drama raising these issues has been developing for some years in the village of Addison, a suburb of Chicago, that came to a head in late 1990s. Addison is a blue-collar community about twenty-five miles west of downtown Chicago, not far from O'Hare Airport. In August 1997, the village found itself on the front page of the *New York Times*, where it was announced that this municipality of 32,000 residents was agreeing to one of the largest financial settlements in a federal housing discrimination suit, in which the Justice Department had charged village officials with bias against Latino immigrants.

Until after World War II, Addison was mostly farmland. But soon the village experienced an influx of the adult children of Italian, Polish, and Greek immigrants who had grown up in Chicago's urban neighborhoods and who were buying their first homes. The single-family houses in Addison, especially those involved in this controversy, were built in the 1950s and 1960s. They are typically small but solid structures, one-story brick houses capable of withstanding the harsh midwestern winters. Not coincidentally, many of Addison's homeowners work in the construction trades.

But not all of Addison's dwellings are single-family houses. Many are also small, square apartment buildings of the sort found throughout Chicago and its suburbs: two- and three-storey structures with a central entry and stairwell accommodating two to four apartments per floor. In Addison many such buildings were constructed during the 1960s in clusters near the village's main thoroughfare and its civic center. For ambiguous if not downright shady reasons, these apartments were afforded zoning waivers that allowed them to be built close together, with minimal off-street parking.

At first there were no particular problems, especially since the landlords screened prospective tenants, who were typically flight attendants working out of nearby O'Hare. But things soon began to deteriorate. Tenant screening grew lax or nonexistent. Poor whites took up residence, and by the early 1980s, Mexicans, mostly from the barrios of Chicago but soon also directly from Mexico, were moving in. They were—and continue to be—drawn to the area by abundant employment opportunities in nearby warehouses and light industries. As with most such migrations, the influx was at first mostly young, unattached men, intent on working long hours and amassing money to send home, where most planned to return. These "target earners" crowded

into these one- and two-bedroom apartments to maximize their savings, sometimes sleeping in shifts.

But such commendable striving resulted not only in overcrowding, but in wear and tear on buildings, which absentee landlords never maintained very well—even when municipal authorities began serious enforcement of housing and sanitation codes. Even by the late 1990s, when the worst conditions had been addressed, these buildings were dilapidated, with tattered screens and shabby curtains billowing in the wind. A few windows were boarded up with plywood, while in some buildings the main entrance doors had been removed from their hinges.

Parking was an issue from the outset. Although Addison has long prohibited on-street overnight parking, an exception had been granted to these apartment buildings—allowing for higher-density occupancy. But immigrant overcrowding meant that cars were overwhelming the streets and whatever off-street parking that was available. Residents serviced their cars in the street, sometimes leaving old parts on the sidewalks or in the gutters. Abandoned cars were not uncommon. Safety issues arose about children playing around all those cars, hidden from passing drivers. Other concerns were raised about fire safety, especially in winter, when snowed-in cars hindered fire department access to the buildings.

Parking lots were soon covered with broken glass and litter. Shopping carts that had been used to transport groceries home from nearby supermarkets were strewn about, left to rust. Small plots that were once planted with grass became muddy rectangles, long since trampled by residents who would seek relief from the summer heat in overcrowded apartments by congregating outside—sitting in lawn chairs, barbecuing, drinking beer, and partying, often late into the evening. There were comings and goings around the clock, with cars announcing their arrival with honking horns.

Residents of nearby single-family homes were understandably unhappy—even more so when such socializing degenerated into public urination and drag races in the streets. Groups of young Mexicans hanging out at all hours of the day and night harassed neighborhood women who had long been used to walking by the apartments on their way to nearby shopping centers. Fruits and vegetables began disappearing from homeowners' gardens. And graffiti occasionally appeared on the brick facades of their neat houses.

Youth gangs and drug dealing were soon evident. There was violence and at least one shooting death—along with occasional bursts of gunfire, cele-

brating July 4, for example. As one longtime Addison homeowner, who lived a block from one group of apartments, observed: "It's like the housing projects"—which he and his wife had fled forty years before when they left the Chicago neighborhoods where their immigrant parents had raised them.

The response of Addison officials was not surprising. Police presence in and around the apartments was increased. There were also some initiatives with social programs for neighborhood youths. The police even organized soccer matches between the immigrants and themselves, and according to the chief, his men's defeat was the basis of renewed mutual respect between officers and the Mexicans. An on-street parking ban, consistent with the rest of Addison, was implemented despite criticism that it discriminated against immigrants.

But the most controversial measures were those intended to reduce population density by condemning and then razing several of the apartment buildings. Addison officials then proposed a business redevelopment plan that would have resulted in the rezoning and demolition of several more buildings—and of course, the relocation of many immigrants.

It was around this time, in the mid-1990s, that immigrant advocates joined forces with Chicago-area housing advocates—veterans of the open-housing battles of the civil rights era in what has been widely and correctly regarded as one of the most segregated metropolitan regions in the nation. Objections to Addison's policies became the basis of the federal housing discrimination suit mentioned above. That litigation resulted in the 1997 settlement committing the village of Addison to cease further demolition of apartments and to pull back on its redevelopment initiative. Addison officials also agreed to provide relocation expenses to displaced immigrant tenants and to establish social service programs and a community center for remaining immigrants.

Housing and immigration advocates charged that Addison officials and homeowners were motivated by bigotry. But alternative explanations are more plausible and fair-minded to all parties involved—though undoubtedly less likely to prevail in housing discrimination suits. My own field work and interviews in Addison indicate that prejudice or racism have little to do with what has been going on there. To be sure, there have been heated exchanges in which residents expressed exasperation with "not hearing English on the street." And it would be foolhardy to insist that there is no racism lurking among the working- and lower-middle-class homeowners of Addison. But it is worth pointing out that Latino homeowners and business operators in

Addison (of which there are a few) were among those concerned about the disorder at the apartments—though these Latino residents have felt cross-pressured and have been reluctant to express their concerns publicly.

More to the point, there were few, if any, incidents of hate speech or xenophobia throughout the controversy. The genuine anger expressed was directed—by homeowners and municipal officials alike—at the apartments' absentee landlords. There was little or no animosity toward immigrants generally, or Latinos or Mexicans specifically—though illegal immigrants were frequently denounced. I have examined controversies involving immigrants in communities across the nation and interviewed native-born "Anglo" Americans who *do* harbor negative and hostile sentiments toward newcomers. But I found none in Addison. Perhaps they were in evidence when tensions were at their peak in the mid-1990s, but I found no record of them. By the time I got there in 1998 and on subsequent visits, I certainly encountered nothing of the kind.

One possible explanation is that Addison's homeowners are themselves typically the sons and daughters of immigrants. To be sure, this might render them overly sensitive to the urban disorder many of them fled. But their immigrant origins might also afford Addison residents certain sympathies for the new Mexican immigrants. Such sentiments were certainly expressed both by homeowners and even municipal officials there—at least one of whom was an immigrant from India. As one homeowner, expressing his exasperation with accusations of racial discrimination, put it: "I'm not white. I'm Italian!" Finally, it is worth emphasizing that Addison is a blue-collar suburb whose residents have dealt with other forms of urban disorder and who are hardly preoccupied with maintaining some pristine, privileged suburban enclave.

Another dynamic—worries about job competition from immigrants—was not evident among the homeowners of Addison. Such reactions would confirm the expectations of many observers. Nevertheless, employment concerns have not surfaced in Addison. If anything, as small businessmen have engaged in the construction trades, many Addison residents are prone to regarding these immigrants as potential employees.

Nor for that matter have Addison homeowners been riled up primarily by declining property values. To be sure, housing prices have apparently been affected by these events. For families such as these, whose life savings are tied up in their homes, property values have always been an issue. But when longtime residents emphasize that young families with children are not

moving in because the local schools have been overwhelmed by non-English-speaking children, their comments seem driven neither by racism nor pocketbook calculations. They are expressing anxieties about how the community where they raised their families is threatened.

Still another factor not relevant to events in Addison is the presence of illegal immigrants. To be sure, a good number of the immigrants drawn there and to metropolitan Chicago generally are illegals. And these disgruntled homeowners are, like most Americans, quick to disparage them. Yet the problems in Addison have had little to do with these immigrants being undocumented and more to do with being “target earners” focused on returning home with as much savings as possible, or with the disruptions to family life that immigrants have always had to cope with.

Finally, the problems in this and other such communities are rooted not so much in crime as in disorder. This is not exactly news to Addison homeowners. As one housewife who had raised two boys down the street from the apartments noted, “All we need here is some control.” She then contrasted the situation in Addison with her own experience, raised by Polish immigrant parents in an apartment building near what later became the Cabrini-Green housing project. She noted how she and her friends would seldom risk stepping on the grassy plot in front of their building—not out of any deep sense of propriety, but out of fear that the resident janitor would scold them or perhaps speak to their parents.

This insight was echoed not only by municipal officials in Addison, but also by one of the Mexican immigrant leaders. Emphasizing how little his countrymen understand about American practices and expectations, this leader pointed out that many of them come from rural areas of Mexico and lack familiarity even with calling 911 in an emergency. Nor, at first, do they understand the seriousness of driving without a license, auto registration, or insurance—until they get caught. At one point acknowledging the validity of some of the complaints about the influx of immigrants into Addison, this person voiced the frustration expressed by other immigrants as well as those providing them services: “I wish someone would tell us how the hell we’re supposed to act here!”

IMMIGRATION AND COMMUNITY POLICING

Wesley Skogan has written: “Insecurity is . . . generated by visible signs that no one is in charge or cares about what happens to the area.” Skogan is

commenting on neighborhood disorder and crime, but he might just as well be writing about immigration. His insight certainly helps explain why Americans are so uneasy with an immigration policy that allows unprecedented numbers of newcomers, illegal and legal, but does little to help orient or integrate them into our culture or institutions. The irony of course is that Addison and communities like it have stepped into this vacuum and attempted to take charge. They may or may not be up to the job. But they deserve better than simply being dismissed as racists.

Insights about the significance of apparently minor neighborhood disorders have of course led to innovative programs like community policing. It is then all the more relevant that research on the implementation of such programs consistently finds that they are not very successful in poor, minority neighborhoods, especially immigrant neighborhoods.

A young officer with the Santa Ana (California) police who patrols his territory on bicycle pointed out one problem. Because immigrants, especially illegal immigrants, typically carry no or false ID, it is difficult to issue them meaningful citations and summonses for minor, quality-of-life infractions like drinking in the park. After all, to do broken-windows-oriented policing you need to know the identity of the individuals you’re dealing with.

But the more fundamental problem involves community policing’s dependence on cooperative, proactive clients. Race and class immediately complicate this picture. So does diversity, which research reveals weakens the informal relationships and understandings on which community policing relies. All these factors of course come into play with immigrants. But so do others. Illegal immigrants are less likely to cooperate with public officials out of fear of detection and eventual deportation. Other problems arise even with legal immigrants, not the least of which are language barriers between them and the police. Many immigrants arrive with ingrained distrust of police and government authorities. Then, too, immigrants here as target earners are hardly preoccupied with putting down roots and developing community ties.

Let’s look again at Santa Ana. It has a longtime commitment to community policing, and has been described by Jerome Skolnick and David Bayley as “the most innovative police organization in the U.S.” Santa Ana also has a population that is about 80 percent Hispanic, most of whom are foreign-born. It is then worth listening when a veteran officer there, speaking bluntly but without malice, sums up the dilemma facing him and his colleagues: “How do you do community policing when there is no community?”

Indeed, Wesley Skogan's findings from Houston reveal that Latinos there were strikingly less involved with community policing programs than African Americans and whites. And in his evaluation of Chicago's community policing initiative, Skogan writes that despite some success with whites and blacks, "Hispanics did not benefit, though, and it appears that they did not even get the message." At the end of his exhaustive study, Skogan concludes: "One of the biggest challenges to community policing in Chicago will be to find ways to involve the Hispanic community in it . . . at almost every point, we found that Hispanics were left out of CAPS [the Chicago program]."⁶

Such findings are particularly sobering in light of what we have seen in Addison, for they suggest that one of law enforcement's most promising tools to address urban disorder—community policing—will have limited applicability precisely where disorder is particularly troublesome. And this means that the disorder in immigrant-impacted communities like Addison may well get worse before it gets better.

To be fair, not all disorder in immigrant neighborhoods originates from within. Some comes from outside. As Addison underscores, public policies like urban renewal and business improvement districts displace people. The immigrants living in the buildings demolished in Addison certainly had to go somewhere and probably moved in with friends and relatives, thereby resulting in overcrowding somewhere else.

Another example are the neighborhood sweeps that federal immigration officials have long relied on (though less so in recent years) to apprehend large numbers of illegal aliens. However efficient such methods may be, they are highly disruptive, if not terrifying, undertakings that engender distrust and paranoia among immigrants. In other words, they undermine the social order and communal norms that do exist in these neighborhoods.

To note this is not necessarily to argue against such policies. It is, however, to highlight one of their consequences. But neither is it meant to assign blame to immigrants. The fact is that immigrants, especially poor, uneducated immigrants with limited English, are highly vulnerable, particularly in this tough, competitive society. We Americans, waxing poetic about our immigrant history, are prone to forget this. In this, we are like a football coach who is suddenly horrified when the rookie quarterback he sent into the game without adequate training comes out injured. In any event, their obvious vulnerabilities are one reason why immigrants are invariably—and not unfairly—associated by many Americans with social disorder.

MOVING AWAY FROM DISORDER

So many Americans can and do vote with their feet and flee heavily immigrant-impacted communities. This has certainly occurred in California. And it has happened in Addison, where disgruntled homeowners have picked up and moved away—evidently farther out from the city. The non-Hispanic population of Addison—both as an absolute number and as a percentage—certainly declined between 1990 and 2000, while the Hispanic population mushroomed.

Now, this is a familiar pattern. Geographic mobility coupled with high levels of economic growth has long distinguished us from the nations of Europe and undoubtedly helps explain our relative success in dealing with the strains of mass immigration. As historian Robert Wiebe has put it: "What held Americans together was their ability to live apart."⁷

Yet in the contemporary context, this geographic mobility translates into urban sprawl, one of the costs of victories such as that in Addison that open-housing advocates rarely acknowledge. And like any safety valve, this delays the reckoning that must eventually take place. Without gainsaying the value of "exit" in defusing tensions, this is one reason politicians are able to avoid dealing with immigration. This in turn results in a boom-and-bust policy cycle whose polarizing swings have not led to sound decisions.

Many of the signs of disorder examined here can easily be dismissed as minor—as "nothing serious," as one Chicago resident characterized the nightly gauntlet of comments that she and other women put up with from drunks hanging out at the subway stop near their home. But such incidents have cumulative effects that result in anxiety, anger, avoidance, and eventually exit. Policymakers, elected officials, and ordinary citizens ignore such behaviors at their peril.

Yet the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have clearly made it more difficult for officials to focus on reducing such relatively minor incivilities. The urgency of fighting terrorism has crowded local crime off the policy agenda. With serious crime rates rising but still low in terms of our recent history, the necessary political pressure to put crime back on the agenda may not be there. The social strains and disorder examined here are likely to fare even less well. Indeed, the Bush administration has already made deep cuts in federal programs for local law enforcement, and now federal funds for community policing initiatives are on the block.

But there may be an even more fundamental divide here. Since September

11, there have been enormous efforts among political and policy elites to draw a sharp line between immigrants and terrorists. We have been reminded over and over that “most immigrants are not terrorists.” The logic of this perspective was carried to its extreme, not surprisingly, by the *Wall Street Journal* editorial page, commenting on the federal government’s failed suit against Tyson Foods for procuring illegal immigrant workers: “We are consoled that Justice lost this case, which should never have been pursued. The government’s resources are limited. Time and money spent chasing Mexicans out of chicken plants is better spent tracking people who enter the country to do us harm.” Meanwhile, from within the mammoth new department of homeland security, concerns are voiced that immigration enforcement is getting neglected.

If these indeed are the choices facing us, then clearly we must focus on terrorism. But immigration and the social-order effects examined here will not disappear. When these strains resurface, elected officials and policymakers will almost certainly try to avoid dealing with them. But sooner or later we will as a society have to confront this intractable issue.

NOTES

1. Jane Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (New York: Vintage, 1961): 31–32.
2. James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998): 134.
3. Mark H. Moore, “Security and Economic Development,” in Ronald F. Ferguson and William T. Dickens, eds., *Urban Problems and Community Development* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1999): 306.
4. Robert J. Sampson, “What ‘Community’ Supplies,” in Ferguson and Dickens, *Urban Problems and Community Development*, 271.
5. Wesley G. Skogan, *Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Neighborhoods* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990): 49.
6. Wesley G. Skogan and Susan M. Hartnett, *Community Policing, Chicago Style* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997): 245.
7. Robert H. Wiebe, *The Segmented Society: An Introduction to the Meaning of America* (New York: Oxford, 1975): 46.

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