Curriculum Vitae

Emine Tasci

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2019 - Present **Ph.D.** in Economics

BOSTON COLLEGE, USA

2017 – 2019 **M.Sc.** in Economics

BOGAZICI UNIVERSITY, TURKEY

Ranked first in my graduating cohort

Thesis title: "Redesigning the High School Placement Mechanism in Turkey"

2011 – 2017 B.A in Economics

2011 - 2017

BOGAZICI UNIVERSITY, TURKEY

B.S in Mathematics

BOGAZICI UNIVERSITY, TURKEY

Ranked first in my graduating cohort

REFERENCES

Lucas Coffman

Department of Economics Boston College coffmanl@bc.edu Utku Unver

Department of Economics Boston College unver@bc.edu Bumin Yenmez

Department of Economics Washington University bumin@wustl.edu

Research Interests

Behavioral Market Design, Experimental Economics, Gender Economics, Mechanism Design

WORKING PAPERS

STRATEGYPROOF, BUT GENDERPROOF? (JMP)

Matching algorithms, such as deferred acceptance, are commonly used throughout the world in important markets because of their incentive compatibility. Through a series of re-analysis of existing data as well as with novel experiments, I show that while these algorithms are theoretically strategy-proof", many women do not always apply to their most preferred jobs or colleges; i.e. the" mechanisms are not "gender-proof", and leading to under-representation of women at top programs. I document the gender difference in misreporting both in data from Chinese high school students and experimental data from U.S. medical students. In both settings, female applicants are more likely than male applicants to rank less prestigious options at the top of their preference lists. In an online experiment with 1488 subjects, I aim to disentangle two leading explanations for this gap: confusion or social concerns. Participants deciding on behalf of others are more likely to apply to the most preferred options, while the intervention aimed at alleviating confusion does not improve applications for women, suggesting psychological or social factors may also be influencing their decisions. However, two interventions designed to increase the social appropriateness of applying to a prestigious option—encouragement and an affirmative action policy—both lead to meaningful improvements. These findings suggest that market design should incorporate the molding of social norms to increase the representation of female applicants in top programs.

REDUCING GENDER DIFFERENCES BY FIRST CHOOSING FOR OTHERS with Lucas Coffman

INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY OF MATCHING MECHANISMS UNDER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION POLICIES

CERTIFICATES

The Center for Teaching Excellence

EMPLOYMENT

2024 Lab Manager Boston College

Consumer Insights Lab at Carroll School of Management

2024 Instructor Boston College

Game Theory, Summer 2024 Rating: 4.25/5

2023-2024 Teaching Assistant at Division of Continuing Education HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Principles of Economics: Microeconomics, Summer 2023 & 2024

Game Theory and Strategic Decisions, Summer 2023

Managerial Economics, Spring 2023

2019 – 2024 Teaching and Research Assistant Boston College

Principles of Economics, Spring 2023

Statistics, Fall 2022

Economics of Education, Spring 2022 Microeconomic Theory, Spring 2021

Research Assistant to M. Bumin Yenmez, Summer 2020 & 2021

Market Design, Spring 2020 Game Theory, Fall 2019 & Fall 2020 Microeconomic Theory, Fall 2019

2017 – 2019 Teaching and Research Assistant BOGAZICI UNIVERSITY

Presentations (Including Scheduled)

2024 Southern Economic Association

North American Meeting of the Economic Science Association

3B (BC-Brown-BU) Theory Workshop

Western Economic Association International (CSWEP Session)

Boston College Graduate Research Symposium

Awards & Scholarships

2023 Dissertation Fellowship by Economics Department of Boston College

Murat Sertel Award: First prize in Economics Department for Master's Degree

First prize in Mathematics Department

The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey - Undergraduate Scholarship

Programme

2019

2017

Zorlu Fellowship - Undergraduate Scholarship Programme

SKILLS

PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES

R, Matlab, C, STATA, LaTex, Windows Applications

Languages

English (Fluent)

Turkish (Native)