

UZI SEGAL

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Degrees

B.Sc. in Mathematics, Economics, and Statistics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1978.

M.A. in Economics, Hebrew University, 1980.

Ph.D. in Economics. Thesis: “The connection between beliefs and preferences in economics.” Supervisor: M.E. Yaari. Hebrew University, 1984.

Professional Career

Dept. of Economics, University of Toronto: Assistant Professor (1985–1990), Associate Professor (1990–1992), Professor (1992–1994).

Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario: Professor (1994–1999).

Department of Economics, Boston College: Professor (1999–).

Warwick Business School: Professor of Behavioural Science. (2013–2019)

Visiting positions: Nuffield College, University of Pennsylvania, UCLA, CalTech, UCSD, UC Irvine, Tel Aviv University, IDC (Israel).

Short visits: Hebrew University (Economics, Law), Tel Aviv University (Economics, School of Management, Law), Ecole Normale Supérieure De Cachan, Paris II.

Publications in refereed journals

1. Large compound lotteries (with Z. Safra). *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, forthcoming.
2. Social influence in committee deliberation (with C. Fershtman). *Theory & Decision*, 96 (2024), 185–207.
3. \forall or \exists ? *Theoretical Economics*, 18 (2023), 1–13.
4. All probabilities are equal, but some probabilities are more equal than others (with C. Letsou and S. Naeh). *Economic Theory*, 74 (2022), 423–445.
5. A lot of ambiguity (with Z. Safra). *Journal of Economic Theory*, 200 (2022), p. 105393.
6. Intransitivity in the small and in the large (with S. Bikhchandani). *Journal of Risk & Uncertainty*, 63 (2021), 257–273.
7. Allocation mechanisms without reduction (with D. Dillenberger). *American Economic Review: Insights*, 3 (2021), 455–69.
8. Calibration results for incomplete preferences (with Z. Safra), *Revue Economique*, 71 (2020), 323–330.
9. Preferences and social influence (with C. Fershtman), *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics*, 10 (2018), 124–142.
10. Skewed noise (with D. Dillenberger). *Journal of Economic Theory*, 169 (2017), 344–364.
11. Recursive ambiguity and Machina’s examples (with D. Dillenberger). *International Economic Review*, 56 (2015), 55–61.
12. Transitive regret over statistically independent lotteries (with S. Bikhchandani). *Journal of Economic Theory*, 152 (2014), 237–248.
13. Utilitarianism and discrimination (with A. Harel). *Social Choice & Welfare*, 42 (2014), 367–380.

14. Who benefits from the uniformity of contingent fee rates? (with E. Zamir and B. Medina). *Review of Law & Economics*, 9 (2013), 357–387.
15. Ranking ranking rules (with B. Medina and S. Naeh). *Review of Law & Economics*, 9 (2013), 73–96.
16. On the likelihood of cyclic comparisons (with A. Rubinstein). *Journal of Economic Theory*, 147 (2012), 2483–2491.
17. No externalities: a characterization of efficiency and incentive compatibility with public goods (with J. Ostroy). *Social Choice & Welfare*, 39 (2012), 697–719.
18. Transitive regret (with Sushil Bikhchandani). *Theoretical Economics*, 6 (2011), 95–108.
19. Risk aversion in the small and in the large: Calibration results for betweenness functionals (with Zvi Safra). *Journal of Risk & Uncertainty*, 38:1 (2009), 27–37.
20. Calibration results for non-expected utility theories (with Zvi Safra). *Econometrica*, 76:5 (2008), 1143–1166.
21. A Characterization of Intrinsic Reciprocity (with Joel Sobel). *International Journal of Game Theory*, 36:3–4 (2008), 571–585.
22. Unanimous subjective probabilities (with Kim Border and Paolo Ghirardato), *Economic Theory*, 34:2 (2008), 383–387.
23. The ambiguous nature of ambiguity and crime control (with Anat Horowitz). *NYU Journal of Law and Liberty* (2007), 542–557.
24. Tit for tat: Foundations of preferences for reciprocity in strategic settings (with Joel Sobel), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 136:1 (2007), 197–216.
25. Ambiguity aversion and the criminal process (with Alex Stein), *Notre Dame Law Review*, 81:4 (2006), 1495–1551.
26. Fair bias, *Economics and Philosophy*, 22 (2006), 213–229.

27. Democratically elected aristocracies (with David Heyd), *Social Choice & Welfare*, 27 (2006), 103–127.
28. Ex-post egalitarianism and legal justice (with Alon Harel and Zvi Safra), *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, 21 (2005), 57–75.
29. Super majoritarianism and the endowment effect (with Uriel Procaccia), *Theory & Decision*, 55 (2004), 181–207.
30. Min, max, and sum (with Joel Sobel), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 106 (2002), 126–150.
31. Coherent odds and subjective probability (with Kim C. Border), *Journal of Mathematical Psychology*, 46 (2002), 253–268.
32. On the Economic meaning of Machina’s Fréchet differentiability assumption (with Zvi Safra), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 104 (2002), 450–461.
33. Rank dependent preferences without ranking axioms (with Zvi Safra), *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 35 (2001), 547–562.
34. Let’s agree that all dictatorships are equally bad, *Journal of Political Economy*, 108 (2000), 569–589.
35. Don’t fool yourself to believe you won’t fool yourself again *Economics Letters*, 67 (2000), 1–3.
36. Criminal law and behavioral law and economics: Observations on the neglected role of uncertainty in deterring crime (with Alon Harel), *American Law and Economics Review*, 1 (2000), 276–312.
37. Efficient incentive compatible economies are perfectly competitive (with Louis Makowski and Joseph M. Ostroy), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 85 (1999), 169–225.
38. Constant risk aversion (with Zvi Safra), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 83 (1998), 19–42.
39. Punishment schedules for capital flight (with D. Vincent), *The World Economy*, 21 (1998) 629–638.

40. Preferences over solutions to the bargaining problems (with Kim C. Border), *Econometrica*, 65 (1997), 1–18.
41. Dynamic consistency and reference points, *Journal of Economic Theory*, 72 (1997) 208–219.
42. First-order risk aversion and non-differentiability (with A. Spivak), *Economic Theory*, 9 (1997), 179–183.
43. How complicated are betweenness preferences? (with Z. Safra), *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 24 (1995), 371–381.
44. Observing orders of risk aversion (with G. Loomes), *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, 9 (1994), 239–256.
45. Dynamic consistency implies approximately expected utility (with K. Border), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 63 (1994), 170–188.
46. A sufficient condition for additively separable functions, *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 23 (1994), 295–303.
47. The projective independence axiom (with Chew S.H. and L.G. Epstein), *Economic Theory*, 4 (1994), 189–215.
48. Stochastic transitivity and quadratic representation functions, *Journal of Mathematical Psychology*, 38 (1994), 102–114.
49. Dutch book arguments and subjective probability (with K. Border), *Economic Journal*, 104 (1994), 71–75.
50. Order indifference and rank-dependent probabilities, *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 22 (1993), 373–397.
51. The measure representation: A correction, *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, 6 (1993), 99–107.
52. The Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism and generalized utility theories: Theoretical predictions and empirical observations (with L.R. Keller and T. Wang), *Theory & Decision*, 34 (1993), 83–97.
53. Dominance axioms and multivariate nonexpected utility preferences (with Z. Safra), *International Economic Review* 34 (1993), 321–334.

54. Stochastic dominance under Bayesian learning (with S. Bikhchandani and S. Sharma), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 56 (1992), 352–377.
55. Quadratic social welfare functions (with L.G. Epstein), *Journal of Political Economy*, 100 (1992), 691–712. Reprinted in J. Wood (ed.): *Amartya Sen: Critical Assessments of Contemporary Economists*, Routledge (2006).
56. Additively separable representations on non-convex sets, *Journal of Economic Theory*, 56 (1992), 89–99.
57. Mixture symmetry and quadratic utility functions, (with Chew S.H. and L.G. Epstein), *Econometrica*, 59 (1991), 139–163.
58. Existence and dynamic consistency of Nash equilibrium with nonexpected utility preferences, (with E. Dekel and Z. Safra), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 55 (1991), 229–246.
59. Two stage lotteries without the reduction axiom, *Econometrica*, 58 (1990), 349–377.
60. The Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism and nonexpected utility: A testable approach, (with Z. Safra and A. Spivak), *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, 3 (1990), 177–190.
61. Preference reversals and nonexpected utility behavior, (with Z. Safra and A. Spivak), *American Economic Review*, 80 (1990), 922–930.
62. First order versus second order risk aversion (with A. Spivak), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 51 (1990), 111–125. Reprinted in C. Goullier, ed.: *The Economics of Risk and Uncertainty*. Edward Elgar Pub., 2018.
63. Firm size and optimal growth rates (with A. Spivak), *European Economic Review*, 33 (1989), 159–67.
64. Anticipated utility: A measure representation approach, *Annals of Operations Research*, 19 (1989), 359–73.
65. Probabilistic insurance and anticipated utility, *Journal of Risk and Insurance*, LV (1988), 287–97.

66. Precautionary saving and risk aversion: An anticipated utility approach (with A. Spivak and J. Zeira), *Economics Letters*, 27 (1988), 223–227.
67. Non-expected utility risk premiums: The cases of probability ambiguity and outcome uncertainty (with A. Spivak), *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, (1988) 1, 333–347.
68. Does the preference reversal phenomenon necessarily contradict the independence axiom? *American Economic Review*, 78 (1988), 233–36.
69. The Ellsberg paradox and risk aversion: An anticipated utility approach, *International Economic Review*, 28 (1987), 175–202.
70. Some remarks on Quiggin’s anticipated utility, *Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization*, 8 (1987), 145–54.
71. On the single member constituency and the law of large numbers (with A. Spivak), *Public Choice*, 49 (1986), 183–90.
72. On lexicographic probability relations, *Mathematical Social Sciences*, 11 (1986), 195–99.
73. On the separability of the quasi-concave closure of an additively separable function, *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 14 (1985), 129–134.
74. A theorem on the additivity of the quasi-concave closure of an additive convex function, *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 11 (1983), 261–266.

Contributed Papers

1. Cycles (with S. Naeh), in C. Dagan and B. Porat (eds.): *Justice Seekers* (in Hebrew), 2016, pp. 630–648.
2. Distributive justice, in U. Procaccia (ed.): *A Handbook of Law and Economics* (in Hebrew), 2012, pp. 113–150.
3. Thou shalt not sow thy vineyard with divers seeds? The case against the harmonization of private law (with Uriel Procaccia), in K.J. Hopt & E. Wymeersch (eds.): *Capital Markets and Company Law*, 639–659. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

4. Dynamic consistency and non-expected utility, in L. Luini (ed.): *Uncertain Decisions*, 39–52. Boston: Kluwer AP, 1999.
5. The independence axiom versus the reduction axiom: Must we have both? In W. Edwards (ed.): *Utility Theories: Measurement and Applications*, 165–183. Boston: Kluwer AP, 1992.

Books

1. Mathematics for Economists 1 (with A. Rubinstein). Jerusalem: Academic, 1981 (In Hebrew).
2. Mathematics for Economists. Tel Aviv: Everyman University. 1993 (in Hebrew).

Editorial Boards

- *Econometrica* (Associate Editor 1995–2010)
- *Journal of Economic Theory* (Associate Editor 2012–2014)
- *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty* (Advisory Editor 1991–94, Associate Editor 1994–)
- *Theoretical Economics* (Associate Editor 2005–)
- *Economics Letters* (Associate Editor 2018–2023)
- Senior program committee, 18th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017
- Program committee, Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society, 2009

Other

- Fellow of the Econometric Society (2012)
- Economic Theory Fellow (2011)

Research Grants

- Connaught Fund #3-370-156-90, 1987 (two years).
- SSHRC #410-87-1375, 1987 (one year).
- SSHRC #410-88-0558, 1988 (two years).
- SSHRC #410-90-1494, 1990: Applications of non-expected utility models (two years).
- SSHRC #410-92-0622, 1992: Theoretical foundations of experimental decision theory (three years).
- SSHRC #410-95-0168, 1995: Decision theory and preferences for fairness (three years).
- SSHRC #410-98-0486, 1998: Decision theory, preferences for fairness, and mechanisms (three years).
- NSF, 2001: Quasi-Concave Social Welfare Functions.
- NSF, 2006: Are Universal Preferences Possible? Calibration Results for Non-Expected Utility Theories.